The Kantian versus Frankfurt

Blum, Alex

doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00242

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…So if I were not even able to avoid voluntarily W-ing, if I did not have even this very weak alternative possibility available to me, I would then -as a result -lose all responsibility for my W-ing. 24 (I will defend this conclusion further in the section below entitled BWhy the Blockage Argument Fails.^) 21 For variations of this argument, see Blum (2000); Clarke (2000, 166); Fischer (1994Fischer ( , 137-139, 144-145, 1999; Fischer and Ravizza (1998, 99-101); Goetz (2002, 132); Hetherington (2003, 231-232); Larvor (2010, 507-508); McKenna (1997, 73-74); Mele (2006, 92-93); Speak (2005, 264, 266); Widerker (1995a, 256-258); Wyma (1997, 61); Yaffe (1999, 220-222); Zagzebski (2000, 241). Widerker (2003, 53) formulates PAP itself in terms of the power to avoid.…”

Section: The Flicker Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Blocking Blockage

Levy

2016

Philosophia

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The Blockage Argument is designed to improve upon Harry Frankfurt's famous argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) by removing the counterfactual intervener altogether. If the argument worked, then it would prove in a way that Frankfurt's argument does not that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, not even the weakest Bflicker of freedom^(such as the possibility of avoiding voluntary action). Some philosophers have rejected the Blockage Argument solely on the basis of their intuition that the inability to do otherwise is incompatible with moral responsibility. I will argue, however, that it is not merely the inability to do otherwise by itself but rather the inability to do otherwise in combination with the absence of a counterfactual intervener that is incompatible with moral responsibility. If I cannot do otherwise and it is not because of a counterfactual intervener, then it must be the case that I am being forced to choose and therefore act as I do, in which case I cannot be morally responsible for this action. Because the Blockage Argument fails, and because it was really the only way to establish that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, it follows that moral responsibility does indeed require at least one alternative possibility in any given situation. But it turns out that this conclusion does not tip the balance in favor of incompatibilism over compatibilism. It would have if blockage and determinism were equivalent. But they are not. Unlike blockage, determinism is compatible with certain counterfactuals that compatibilists traditionally believed the ability to do otherwise reduces to. So even though moral responsibility is incompatible with blockage, it does not necessarily follow that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism.Keywords Moral responsibility . Harry Frankfurt . Principle of alternative possibilities . Blockage argument . John Martin Fischer . Flicker-of-freedom strategy . Ability to do otherwise . Alternative possibilities . Determinism . Indeterminism . Compatibilism . Incompatibilism

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Section: The Flicker Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Blocking Blockage

Levy

2016

Philosophia

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“…:85) under the formulation inpossibilium nulla obligatio. According to Blum (2000) the thesis can be found also in Pelagius and Augustine. (On the genesis of OIC see Baumgardt [:946].)…”

Section: : a Brief Sketch Of Oic's Historymentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Ought implies Can’ and the law

Fox

Feis

2017

Inquiry

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In this paper we investigate the 'ought implies can' (OIC) thesis, focusing on explanations and interpretations of OIC, with a view to clarifying its uses and relevance to legal philosophy. We first review various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of OIC; then we consider how OIC may be incorporated in Hartian and Kelsenian theories of the law. Along the way we also propose a taxonomy of OIC-related claims.

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“…If u ranges just over propositions such that u-ing is a potential action, then one may well need to distinguish -as Yaffe (1999) and Schnall (2001: 336) do -two versions of the ought-implies-can principle: one for obligations to u and one for obligations to not-u. 35 On versions of this reasoning see: Blum (2000), Copp (1997, Fischer ( : 123-4, 2003, Haji (1993Haji ( , 1994Haji ( : 126, n. 22, 1998aHaji ( : 250, n. 10, 2002, Mellema (2001), Schnall (2001), Widerker (1991Widerker ( , 1995), Widerker and Katzoff (1994), Yaffe (1999), Zimmerman (1993. (Contrast Frankfurt, 1983Wallace, 1994: 204, n. 14.)…”

Section: Objection Vi: Oic Versus the Denial Of The Principle Of Altementioning

confidence: 99%

I Ought, Therefore I Can

Vranas

2007

Philos Stud

129

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I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.

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The Kantian versus Frankfurt

Cited by 8 publications

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Blocking Blockage

Blocking Blockage

‘Ought implies Can’ and the law

I Ought, Therefore I Can

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