I Ought, Therefore I Can

Abstract

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.

The Best Argument for “Ought Implies Can” Is a Better Argument Against “Ought Implies Can”

“…This is because (as we've seen) there is a point to obligations which cannot be fulfilled yet still provide robust action guidance. Another motivation for the guidance principle is that obligations are a kind of reason, and it is characteristic of reasons that we can use them in reasoning about what to do (e.g., Searle 2001;Vranas 2007); on some views this is what distinguishes the reasons for an action from the goodness of that action (Williams 1995;Kolodny 2005). 19 This motivation is consistent with both a broad and narrow reading of the guidance principle.…”

“…To see this assumption made explicit in the discussion of oughts or OIC, see, e.g., Singer (1972), Zimmerman (1996Zimmerman ( ), ryan (2003, Howard-Snyder (2006), Vranas (2007), and Goble (2009). Those who reject the synonymy of "ought" and "obligatory" can read my paper as arguing that our evidence does not show that "obligation to ϕ" implies "can ϕ."…”

“…However, the same is not true in unavoidable baby: Daisy simply does not owe an apology or restitution for her failure to save the baby. 21 Intuitions about these cases seem to pose a problem for theories which deny OIC (Howard-Snyder 2006;Vranas 2007). A DOEr theory needs some way of explaining why Daisy does wrong in avoidable baby but not in unavoidable baby.…”

“…Arguments for OIC sometimes appeal to overguidance intuitions about more bizarre obligations than those in unavoidable baby (e.g., Howard-Snyder 2006;Vranas 2007). For example, it would be great, morally speaking, if I were to fly around the world saving babies like Superman.…”

“…This paper is intended to be relatively ecumenical, and I'll try to avoid arguments that rely on the truth of any specific moral theory. 5 This is because arguments for OIC are typically made independently of any specific moral theory (see, e.g., Copp 2003;Howard-Snyder 2006;Vranas 2007), and it is often taken for granted that any plausible moral view must say that OIC is true (e.g., Zimmerman 1996). let's clarify some terms before getting started.…”