The Best Argument for &amp;#x201C;Ought Implies Can&amp;#x201D; Is a Better Argument Against &amp;#x201C;Ought Implies Can&amp;#x201D;

Talbot, Brian

doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.014

Cited by 5 publications

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References 15 publications

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“…While evidence suggests that the ability condition is not an intuitive requirement on moral responsibility, theorists have also argued that there are antecedent theoretical reasons to reject it that moved beyond what is intuitive (for a review, see Buckwalter 2017a; Talbot 2016). For example, one major theoretical reason, it is often suggested, to accept the condition is to preserve the conclusion that morality is motivational or action guiding.…”

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confidence: 99%

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Buckwalter¹

2018

Philos Stud

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According to one picture of the mind, decisions and actions are largely the result of automatic cognitive processing beyond our ability to control. This picture is in tension with a foundational principle in ethics that moral responsibility for behavior requires the ability to control it. The discovery of implicit attitudes contributes to this tension. According to the ability argument against moral responsibility, if we cannot control implicit attitudes, and implicit attitudes cause behavior, then we cannot be morally responsible for that behavior. The purpose of this paper is to refute the ability argument. Drawing on both scientific evidence in cognitive science and philosophical arguments in ethics and action theory, I argue that it is invalid and unsound because current evidence is insufficient to establish the premises that (1) implicit attitudes are uncontrollable, (2) that they significantly cause behavior, (3) that responsibility always requires ability, and (4) that even if uncontrollable attitudes did fully cause behavior, this entails that the behavior they cause is uncontrollable. The rejection of the ability argument questions the priority of the unconscious over the conscious mind in cognitive science, deprioritizes ability in theories of moral responsibility in ethics, and provides a strong reason to uphold moral responsibility for implicitly biased behavior.

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confidence: 99%

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Buckwalter¹

2018

Philos Stud

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“…But more to the point, this concern is undermined by the fact that the impossible can motivate, in at least two senses. In one sense, impossible obligations can motivate when they inspire us to approximate moral ideals (Talbot 2016). According to Talbot, for example, the directive to Blove all people as one loves oneself^, while impossible for most agents to achieve, might still guide actions in many ways that successfully promote that ideal (2016: 380-81).…”

Section: Theoretical Argument and Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theoretical Motivation of “Ought Implies Can”

Buckwalter

2019

Philosophia

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A standard principle in ethics is that moral obligation entails ability, or that Bought implies can^. A strong case has been made that this principle is not well motivated in moral psychology. This paper presents an analogous case against the theoretical motivation for the principle. The principle is in tension with several foundational areas of ethical theorizing, including research on apologies, excuses, promises, moral dilemmas, moral language, disability, and moral agency. Across each of these areas, accepting the principle that obligation entails ability creates a theoretical problem that is more easily solved by rejecting it rather than accepting it. I conclude that the motivation for the principle is weak and that Bought implies can^should be rejected in ethics on theoretical grounds.

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“…Many philosophers deny “ought” implies “can” without (clearly) accepting the possibility of prototypical dilemmas (e.g. Ryan 2003, Graham 2011, Talbot 2016). And many philosophers endorse weakenings of “ought” implies “can” that allow for non-prototypical dilemmas.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Some plausible moral theories will say that it is wrong for Agnes to steal, even though she can't help herself (e.g. Ryan 2003, Graham 2011, Talbot 2016). This will sometimes put her in a dilemma, since sometimes all her possible choices will be wrong to take.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…I will assume so. This is an instance of a more general issue for moral theories that deny that “ought” implies “can”: any such theory needs an account of when we are and are not obligated to do the impossible (Howard-Snyder 2006, Graham 2011, Talbot 2016, Suikkanen 2019). Interest in consequentializing dilemma-allowing theories assumes that such an account can be given.…”

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Why Impossible Options Are Better: Consequentializing Dilemmas

Talbot¹

2020

Utilitas

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To consequentialize a deontological moral theory is to give a theory which issues the same moral verdicts, but explains those verdicts in terms of maximizing or satisficing value. There are many motivations for consequentializing: to reconcile plausible ideas behind deontology with plausible ideas behind consequentialism, to help us better understand deontological theories, or to extend deontological theories beyond what intuitions alone tell us. It has proven difficult to consequentialize theories that allow for moral dilemmas or that deny that “ought” implies “can.” This article argues that the problem is best solved by allowing impossible actions as inputs into consequentializations. It shows that all other approaches that have been advocated are inadequate. It also argues that progress in consequentialization, and in formal ethics more generally, requires thinking about more than just wrongness and permissibility; we should think about contrary-to-duty obligations and degrees of wrongness as well.

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The Best Argument for “Ought Implies Can” Is a Better Argument Against “Ought Implies Can”

Cited by 5 publications

References 15 publications

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Theoretical Motivation of “Ought Implies Can”

Why Impossible Options Are Better: Consequentializing Dilemmas

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