The Japanese Tenant Protection Law and Asymmetric Information on Tenure Length

Iwata, Shinichiro

doi:10.1006/jhec.2002.0311

Cited by 24 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…17 Since the housing market remains competitive under rent control, it must still be the case that owning the property for an increment of time between u and u + du within a tenancy provides income of rV (q(u), u), where V (q(u), u) is the market value of a controlled housing unit of quality q u units of time into a tenancy. From this relationship, the rent control function, and the boundary condition that b V (qs) = V (qs, 0), V (q(u), u) may be calculated.…”

Section: Analysis Of Optimal Program With Rent Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tenancy rent control and credible commitment in maintenance

Arnott¹,

Shevyakhova²

2014

Regional Science and Urban Economics

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Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. This paper investigates the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality and maintenance. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to "show" it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The paper formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect.

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Section: Analysis Of Optimal Program With Rent Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tenancy rent control and credible commitment in maintenance

Arnott¹,

Shevyakhova²

2014

Regional Science and Urban Economics

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“…Long-staying tenants, knowing this, are incentivized to present themselves as short-staying tenants. Landlords must then maximize their profits in the face of uncertainty engendered by imperfect information on the tenant's true type Emerson 2000, 2003;Arnott and Igarashi 2000;Hubert 1995;Iwata 2002), raising costs for everyone.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing Supply Under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in San Francisco

Asquith

2019

SSRN Journal

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Rent control balances strong tenant protections with supply-side incentives for landlords. However, cities with rent control are also some of the United States' most unaffordable, prompting questions about how well these incentives are working. I examine how controlled landlords change their housing supply in response to price increases using a well-identified hyperlocal demand shock: the privately operated commuter shuttle systems in San Francisco. Controlled landlords increased market withdrawal filings and became less likely to create vacancies via evictions in response to a shuttle stop placement. Policies raising barriers to market withdrawals prompted controlled landlords to respond by increasing their at-fault evictions.

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“…This eviction risk may increase the cost of providing rental houses. Iwata (2002) reported that owners are hesitant to lease to prospective long‐term tenants, such as families, who require a large floor space; indeed, the floor space of 73.5% of the private rental housing stock in 1993 was less than 50 m 2 , and only 9.4% had floor space larger than 70 m 2 5 . Since March 2000, owners have been able to choose between a general contract and a fixed‐term contract .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hubert (1995) and Miceli and Sirmans (1999) investigated the incentive of heterogeneous tenants to choose a long‐term lease (pursuant to which the owners cannot evict the tenants) rather than a short‐term lease, when these contracts are offered by identical owners. As a result, the social consequence of the regulation is evaluated using the tenants’ utility (Iwata 2002), the turnover costs of costly tenants (Börsch‐Supan 1986, Homburg 1993, Hubert 1995), and the vacancies during the search and matching process (Arnott and Igarashi 2000, Raess and von Ungern‐Sternberg 2002). Seko and Sumita (2007b) empirically showed that the revision of the JTPL has improved tenants’ welfare by increasing their available sets of housing tenures.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market

Suzuki

Asami

2017

Real Estate Economics

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In Japan, tenants are protected in the sense that owners must compensate them for evicting them against their will, while owners cannot foresee the intended tenure length of prospective tenants. If owners cannot specify the term of a lease, social inefficiency emerges: (i) detached houses owned by individual households remain vacant for a certain period; (ii) alternatively, landlords’ newly constructed apartments, which are free from eviction risk, accommodate a large proportion of tenants; and (iii) the apartments are rebuilt frequently even though they remain viable. If a fixed‐term contract is available, only short‐term tenants choose it, and the information asymmetry is dissolved, realizing social efficiency.

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The Japanese Tenant Protection Law and Asymmetric Information on Tenure Length

Cited by 24 publications

References 12 publications

Tenancy rent control and credible commitment in maintenance

Tenancy rent control and credible commitment in maintenance

Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing Supply Under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in San Francisco

Tenant Protection, Temporal Vacancy and Frequent Reconstruction in the Rental Housing Market

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