The intersubjective endeavor of psychopathology research: methodological reflections on a second-person perspective approach

Abstract

Research in psychopathology may be considered as an intersubjective endeavor mainly concerned with understanding other minds. Thus, the way we conceive of social understanding influences how we do research in psychology in the first place. In this paper, we focus on psychopathology research as a paradigmatic case for this methodological issue, since the relation between the researcher and the object of study is characterized by a major component of “otherness.” We critically review different methodologies in psychopathology research, highlighting their relation to different social cognition theories (the third-, first-, and second-person approaches). Hence we outline the methodological implications arising from each theoretical stance. Firstly, we critically discuss the dominant paradigm in psychopathology research, based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and on quantitative methodology, as an example of a third-person methodology. Secondly, we contrast this mainstream view with phenomenological psychopathology which—by rejecting the reductionist view exclusively focused on behavioral symptoms—takes consciousness as its main object of study: it therefore attempts to grasp patients’ first-person experience. But how can we speak about a first-person perspective in psychopathology if the problem at stake is the experience of the other? How is it possible to understand the experience from “within,” if the person who is having this experience is another? By addressing these issues, we critically explore the feasibility and usefulness of a second-person methodology in psychopathology research. Notwithstanding the importance of methodological pluralism, we argue that a second-person perspective should inform the epistemology and methods of research in psychopathology, as it recognizes the fundamental circular and intersubjective construction of knowledge.

Towards the recovery of a sense of self: An interpretative phenomenological analysis of patients’ experience of body-oriented psychotherapy for schizophrenia

“…To this purpose, LG wrote detailed minutes immediately after each interview. Although the IPA guidelines do not require such a detailed integration of the recollection of interview in the coding procedure, those recollected aspects provide important information about the implicit and relational context of the elicited data, which we believe is extremely important for the analysis process (see also Galbusera & Fellin, 2014) Thereby, LF (second author) could independently check the trustworthiness of the analysis. Five master themes were initially identified by LG (for preliminary results see Galbusera, 2014); after discussion with LF, we added one master theme concerning the intersubjective dimension of therapeutic change.…”

“…These aspects should be thus taken into consideration when attempting to understand participants' experience. In a previous paper (Galbusera & Fellin, 2014) we discussed the methodological issue of how to validly gauge the firstperson experience of others in clinical research. We briefly critiqued the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis method (IPA; Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009) as a useful qualitative method for understanding research participants' experience (Brocki & Wearden, 2006).…”

O diagnóstico psicopatológico fenomenológico da perspectiva dialético-essencialista

“…Entretanto, essa definição ainda é imprecisa para nossos propósitos. A pluralidade de entendimentos de psicopatologia fenomenológica (SPIEGELBERG, 1964;FORGHIERI, 1993;KRAUS, 2001;PETRELLI, 2005;FINLAY, 2008;AMATUZZI, 2009;GIORGI, 2009;ANDRADE;HOLANDA, 2010;FUCHS, 2010;DEPRAZ;VARELA;VERMERSCH, 2011;GALLAGHER;ZAHAVI, 2013;FEIJOO;MATTAR, 2014;GALBUSERA;FELLIN, 2014) exige que explicitemos qual a modalidade de compreensão de psicopatologia que aqui defendemos. Como ficará evidente ao longo da exposição, nossa proposta apresenta e defende um método qualitativo ajustado para a realização de uma ciência psicopatologia fenomenológica dialético-essencialista (MESSAS; TAMELINI; CUTTING, 2017), cujos conceitos fundamentais são brevemente expostos a seguir.…”

“…O diagnóstico psicopatológico fenomenológico atinge um plano existencial profundo, que depende do conhecimento minucioso, por parte do psicopatologista, das experiências transtornadas do paciente. Esse conhecimento, calcado na experiência observacional interpessoal (MESSAS, 2010;DEPRAZ;VARELA;VERMERSCH, 2011;GALBUSERA;FELLIN, 2014), não deve ser confundido com outros diagnósticos, como o sindrômico (JABLENSKY;KENDELL, 2002) ou o operacional (APA, 2013), que nascem da necessidade de produção de um conhecimento universal, partilhável com toda a sociedade, denominado conhecimento de terceira pessoa (FUCHS, 2010;GARCÍA, 2017). O diagnóstico psicopatológico fenomenológico não se identifica com uma necessidade nosográfica, embora forneça elementos para ela.…”

Preface to the EAWE Portuguese version: A case for a new era of phenomenological psychopathology in psychiatry and clinical psychology

“…There is a long history of debate in phenomenological psychopathology regarding the best way to access the nature of subjective experience, i.e. via the "first-person" or "second-person" perspective (Galbusera & Fellin, 2014). Here, the first-person approach is understood as the self-descriptions of a subject or patient, relying either on a spontaneous narrative or on her self-descriptions…”