While accounting research has demonstrated the role of a decision maker's own emotions during judgments, psychology research proposes that others' emotions provide an informational signal to assess an opponent's limits, cooperativeness, and toughness during bargaining. We examine how a bargaining opponent's emotions provide information signals that can be used by a selling division manager during transfer pricing decisions and whether informal control system choices by corporate management to foster cooperation can create a context that influences how managers react to these signals. In an experiment, when informal controls to encourage cooperation were absent (less collaborative environment), managers' selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent was described as displaying negative emotions than when described as displaying positive emotions. However, when informal controls to cooperate were present (more collaborative environment), managers' selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent displayed positive rather than negative emotions. Path analyses suggest that managers' perception of their opponents' signals is the mechanism by which opponents' emotions influence transfer-price decisions. This study highlights the role of others' emotions as information signals during accounting bargaining and provides insight into the context dependency of opponents' emotions under various control system structures.L'incidence des contrôles informels et des emotions de l'adversaire en situation de n egociation sur les jugements en mati ere de prix de transfertLes chercheurs en comptabilit e ont d emontr e que les emotions propres au d ecideur influaient sur les jugements de ce dernier; les chercheurs en psychologie avancent, quant a eux, que les emotions d'autrui livrent un signal d'information permettant d' evaluer les limites de l'adversaire, sa propension a coop erer et sa d etermination dans des n egociations. Les auteurs se demandent en quoi les emotions d'un adversaire en situation de n egociation livrent des signaux d'information que peut utiliser le responsable d'une division des ventes dans ses d ecisions relatives aux prix de transfert et si les choix de la direction en mati ere de syst emes de contrôles informels visant a favoriser la coop eration peuvent engendrer un contexte qui influencera la fac ßon dont les gestionnaires r eagissent a ces signaux. Selon les r esultats de l'exp erience men ee par les auteurs, en l'absence de contrôles informels visant a favoriser la coop eration (environnement moins favorable a la collaboration), les estimations des prix de vente fournies par les gestionnaires sont plus conciliatoires lorsque l'adversaire * Accepted by Alan Webb. We thank Wendy Bailey, Jim Maroney, May Zhang, Charlie Bame-Aldred, and Velina Popova for their comments. We also thank the two anonymous reviewers and Alan Webb for many valuable comments and suggestions throughout the review process.Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. affiche des emotions n egatives...