The International Scope of Say on Pay

Elst, C.F. van der; Thomas, Randall S.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2307510

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 36 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Also, the vote is binding, not advisory, and only necessary when a board recommends changes to these principles. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have adopted similar Say‐on‐Pay provisions as part of their corporate legislation (Thomas & Van der Elst, ). We observe that the frequency and nature of the voting differ across countries.…”

Section: Say‐on‐paymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We observe that the frequency and nature of the voting differ across countries. Thomas and Van der Elst () attribute these dissimilarities to the degree of concentration of ownership, differences in institutional ownership levels, the degree of social tolerance toward income inequality, and certain political influences in different countries. Table provides information on the adoption of Say‐on‐Pay voting across countries.…”

Section: Say‐on‐paymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay

Stathopoulos¹,

Voulgaris²

2015

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Manuscript Type Review Research Question/Issue This study focuses on the role of Say‐on‐Pay as a mechanism that aims to promote the efficiency of corporate governance by providing an additional channel for the expression of shareholder “voice.” Initially introduced in the UK, Say‐on‐Pay has subsequently been adopted in a large number of countries and it has recently received significant attention from regulators, media, and the general public. The purpose of this study is to review prior literature related to Say‐on‐Pay and its impact on firm value and corporate decision making. Research Findings/Insights Our study highlights the interdisciplinary nature of research on Say‐on‐Pay. We also shed light on conceptual gaps and empirical discrepancies in prior studies, indicating that many questions linked to Say‐on‐Pay and its importance for the executive pay‐setting process remain largely unanswered. Theoretical/Academic Implications At a theoretical level, we highlight potential areas for development of the existing theoretical framework for Say‐on‐Pay, which is at present rather limited and primarily influenced by agency theory. At an empirical level, we propose a substantial number of avenues for fruitful future research on this topic. Practitioner/Policy Implications In the light of recent proposals for extending the role of Say‐on‐Pay within the corporate governance framework, our findings are particularly relevant to regulators. More thought is needed about changing its nature from advisory to binding, as the degree of its effectiveness and the dynamics of the voting process are still unclear. Our study could also be informative for the media and the general public, especially given the increasing attention afforded to Say‐on‐Pay.

show abstract

Section: Say‐on‐paymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Say‐on‐paymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay

Stathopoulos¹,

Voulgaris²

2015

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Under the rule, if 25% of shareholders vote against a company's remuneration report at two consecutive annual general meetings, the entire board may have to stand for re-election within three months. For more details about the international development of SOP, see Thomas and Van der Elst (2013).…”

Section: A Effect Of Sop Votes On Level and Composition Of Executivementioning

confidence: 99%

Say on pay

Ferri¹

2015

Research Handbook on Shareholder Power

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The purpose of this chapter is to present key insights from the academic research on the economic consequences of SOP. The chapter is organized around five parts. Section I provides a brief history of SOP, highlighting its role in the broader context of a gradual shift toward greater shareholder empowerment. The rich set of legislative events accompanying the adoption of SOP in many countries has provided fertile ground for empirical studies. Section II and Section III review the evidence in such studies, focusing on the effect of SOP, respectively, on executive pay and firm value, followed by some concluding remarks in Section IV. 3

show abstract

The corporate response to shareholder activism

Elst

2014

ERA Forum

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The International Scope of Say on Pay

Cited by 7 publications

References 36 publications

The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay

The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay

Say on pay

The corporate response to shareholder activism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About