Say on pay

Ferri, Fabrizio

doi:10.4337/9781782546856.00029

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…The rapidly growing literature on say on pay echoes these different opinions and finds mixed evidence (Ferri 2015). One strand of the literature focuses on the effects of the introduction of sayon-pay regulation on firm value and reports inconclusive results (Cai and Walking 2011, Larcker et al 2011, Ferri and Maber 2013.…”

Section: Related Literature On Say On Paymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous studies suggest that shareholders do not necessarily oppose high CEO pay, so long as the level of pay reflects the quality or economic performance of the CEO. However, shareholders are dissatisfied when they believe or perceive that, given the underlying economic performance, high CEO pay is unjustified or 'excessive' (Ferri andMaber 2013, Krause et al 2014). It is not uncommon for shareholders to resort to remuneration reports for detailed information regarding CEO pay arrangements when they have doubts about the 'appropriateness' of the CEO compensation.…”

Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

Hooghiemstra

Kuang

Qin

2017

Accounting and Business Research

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This paper assesses whether reducing 'readability' is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm's majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of 'obfuscation' in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.

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Section: Related Literature On Say On Paymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

Hooghiemstra

Kuang

Qin

2017

Accounting and Business Research

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When reciprocity becomes back-scratching: an economic inquiry

Murray¹

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This thesis reports four studies of a particular type of cooperation where the formation of coordinated groups through favour exchanges benefits the connected few at the expense of the many. This process is labelled back-scratching, and is a common feature of political decision-making where institutional powers allow for a large amount of discretion and the imposition of externalities in situations where property rights are not well-defined. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of back-scratching in as a coordination game with negative externalities, providing a common framework within which to incorporate the studies that follow.The first study in Chapter 2 uses a natural experiment to quantify the gains from back-scratching in political decisions about value-enhancing land zoning. The effectiveness of a variety methods used to support implicit favouritism are examined, including political donations, employing professional lobbyists, and investing in relationships. Using micro-level relationship data from multiple sources, characteristics of landowners of comparable sites inside and outside rezoned areas are compared. 'Connected' landowners owned 75% of land inside rezoned areas, and only 12% outside, and captured $410 million in value gains, indicating a trade in favours amongst connected insiders. Marginal gains to all landowners of connections in our sample were $190 million. Engaging a professional lobbyist appears to be a substitute for having one's own connections.

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Wachstum und Höhe von Managementvergütungen

Göx

2016

Perspektiven Der Wirtschaftspolitik

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ZusammenfassungRobert F. Göx gibt einen Überblick über die ökonomische Forschung zum Thema Managementvergütungen und erörtert anhand von Daten des Deutschen Aktienindexes (DAX) die Relevanz der überwiegend auf die Vereinigten Staaten fokussierten Forschung für die Entwicklung der Vorstandsvergütungen in Deutschland seit 1985. Dabei zeigt sich, dass diese im Wesentlichen von denselben Faktoren bestimmt wird wie in Amerika. Hinsichtlich der möglichen Ursachen des Anstiegs der Managementbezüge ergibt sich ein gemischtes Bild. Einerseits legen theoretische Argumente und empirische Befunde nahe, dass die Höhe der Vergütungen wesentlich durch die Unternehmensgröße und den finanziellen Erfolg determiniert ist. Andererseits gibt es aber auch eine Reihe von Anhaltspunkten für Ineffizienzen in der Gestaltung der Vergütung, deren Vermeidung wünschenswert erscheint. Allerdings deutet die jüngere Forschung zu den Konsequenzen einschlägiger staatlicher Maßnahmen darauf hin, dass eine stärkere Regulierung der Managementvergütungen kaum geeignet ist, den Vergütungsprozess zu verbessern oder das Wachstum der Bezüge zu begrenzen.

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Say on pay

Cited by 5 publications

References 12 publications

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

When reciprocity becomes back-scratching: an economic inquiry

Wachstum und Höhe von Managementvergütungen

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