The institutional context of crisis. A study of the police response during the 22 July terror attacks in Norway

Abstract

In this paper we address the institutional context of the police response during the 22 July terror attacks in Norway. Our analysis shows how institutionalized informal practices, established over time, influenced the police response during the attacks. The response presented challenges in terms of management of actor complexity (the number of actors involved and the need for coordination) and uncertainty. The importance of these dimensions is discussed based on the police's response during the terror attack in Oslo in 2011. Our analysis of the course of events shows that the resources dedicated to strategic management were marginalized during the event and that insufficient attention was directed towards intelligence and investigation. This contributed to an ineffective police effort to track and capture the perpetrator and prevent or respond to the secondary attack. This is similar to what is often found in hindsight investigations of crises. The aim of this paper is to contextualize and analyze these findings in light of the institutional context of the Norwegian police. Reports from exercises before and after the terror attack indicate that the marginalization of strategic work, intelligence and investigation has been and remains a persistent problem in the Norwegian police. Interviews indicate that there are informal aspects of the police organization regarding status and established conventions of what "proper police work" is about that explain how the observed inadequacies are deeply embedded in the organization.As such, the paper is not a study of a failure in crisis management, but rather the institutional patterns of action that make actions and decisions stand out as meaningful for the actors involved in dealing with situations of high complexity and uncertainty.

To the edge and beyond: How fast-response organizations adapt in rapidly changing crisis situations

“…Second, in frontline organizing, command is delegated to the units closest to the action by making use of ad-hoc allocated personnel, who engage in bounded improvisation to handle the crisis, which is comprehended yet rapidly developing (Barton et al, 2015; Bye et al, 2019; Groenendaal and Helsloot, 2016). It is a crucial mode of fast-response organizing, as frontline officers have access to concrete situational details, which are essential for navigating ambiguity and dynamism (Barton et al, 2015).…”

“…In this context, control means ‘the capacity to focus on the critical tasks that will bring the incident to a non-destructive, non-escalating state’ (Comfort, 2007: 195). Examples of partitioned organizing are visible in the Breivik terrorist attack (Bye et al, 2019; Christensen et al, 2015; Rimstad and Sollid, 2015) and the November 13 Paris terrorist attack (Hirsch et al, 2015), as multiple attacks occurred around the same time at different locations. During the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, too, the devastation was so great that responders struggled to set up a functioning overarching command structure.…”

“…This is important, because a crisis often involves a more continuous process of adaptation, forcing fast-response organizations to switch back and forth between coherent sets of practices that constitute different modes of organizing. For example, studies of the Breivik terror attack in Norway show how the police had difficulty aligning work practices at the command center with those of the various response units (Bye et al, 2019; Christensen et al, 2015; Rimstad and Sollid, 2015). Switching back and forth between centralized and more decentralized modes of organizing proved troublesome, prolonging the devastating attack for hours (Bye et al, 2019).…”

“…For example, studies of the Breivik terror attack in Norway show how the police had difficulty aligning work practices at the command center with those of the various response units (Bye et al, 2019; Christensen et al, 2015; Rimstad and Sollid, 2015). Switching back and forth between centralized and more decentralized modes of organizing proved troublesome, prolonging the devastating attack for hours (Bye et al, 2019). Similar problematic shifts in modes of organizing are visible in the aftermath of 9/11 (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2016) and the Stockwell shooting in London (Colville et al, 2013; Cornelissen et al, 2014).…”

“…This presents multiple challenges in terms of how fast-responders, originating from different administrative units and jurisdictions, temporarily form one organization to coordinate action and retain situational awareness, while composition and leadership may change during the pursuit. Learning from such operations is crucial, as patterns engrained through daily operations are thought to influence action in more extreme operations (Bye et al, 2019).…”