The influence of top management corporate networks on CEO succession

Balsmeier, Benjamin; Buchwald, Achim; Zimmermann, Stefan

doi:10.1007/s11846-011-0073-6

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…This finding is interpreted as evidence that monitoring executed by shareholders and outside directors are substitutes. In addition, similar to Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996), Balsmeier, Buchwald and Zimmermann (2013) find that outside directors who simultaneously hold a management board position seem to facilitate the search for suitable external candidates in the case of (forced) CEO replacements and therefore contribute to improve the control intensity.…”

Section: Executive Turnovermentioning

confidence: 70%

Competition, Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

Buchwald¹

2016

Manage Decis Econ

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. In an environment with effective competition, outsiders do not significantly influence the decision to replace underperforming managers. In fiercely competitive markets, the higher threat of bankruptcy or hostile takeover seems to effectively limit managerial discretion for opportunistic behavior. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Classification: G34, J24, J63, L40, M00

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Section: Executive Turnovermentioning

confidence: 70%

Competition, Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

Buchwald¹

2016

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Most closely related to the present study, Balsmeier et al (2010b) showed that outside board memberships of SB members tend to increase the fluctuation of executives in publicly listed firms. Moreover, Balsmeier et al (2013b) demonstrated that the presence of external managers on SBs of German firms is positively related to external CEO successions.…”

Section: Multiple Directorshipsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Moreover, Balsmeier et al . () demonstrated that the presence of external managers on SBs of German firms is positively related to external CEO successions.…”

Section: Institutional Framework and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Turnover and Outside Directors on Two-Tiered Boards

Balsmeier

Buchwald²,

Dilger

2013

Manage. Decis. Econ.

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This paper examines the determinants of executive turnover on two-tiered boards, emphasizing the monitoring role of supervisory board members with simultaneous outside directorships. Based on a unique sample of executives from large German firms, we find that outside supervisory board members generally increase executive turnover at the firms they monitor. This influence is especially pronounced when outside supervisory board members are simultaneously active as managers themselves and capital control is rather weak. These results suggest that external managers on supervisory boards enhance the monitoring intensity and substitute for weak capital control in the absence of large shareholders. Copyright

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“…For instance, Yermack (2004) 8 shows that turnover is lower for outside directors compared to executives. In addition, outside directors increase the likelihood of external succession (Balsmeier et al, 2013;Borokhovich et al, 1996;Huson et al, 2001). Balsmeier et al (forthcoming) A number of studies address the influence of certain board characteristics on the sensitivity of executive turnover to corporate performance (e.g.…”

Section: Executive Turnover As An Indicator Of Effective Corporate Gomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Forced departures, even for CEOs (Balsmeier et al, 2013;Parrino, 1997 or Hermalin andWeisbach, 2003), are hardly to identify because firms generally do not publish announcements that an executive has been dismissed. Therefore we use executives' age as a simple proxy for forced or unexpected turnovers.…”

Section: Unexpected Turnovermentioning

confidence: 99%

Women on the Board and Executive Duration Evidence for European Listed Firms

Buchwald

Hottenrott

2015

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. February 2014 AbstractThe participation of women in top-level corporate boards (or rather the lack of it) is subject to intense public debate. Several countries are considering legally binding quotas to increase the share of women on boards. Indeed, research on board diversity suggests positive effects of gender diverse boards on corporate governance and even firm performance. The mechanism through which these benefits materialize remain however mostly speculative. We study boards of directors in a large sample of listed companies in 15 European countries over the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011] and find that female representation on firms' non-executive boards is associated with reduced turnover and an increase in tenure of executive board members. An increase in the performance-turnover sensitivity of executives suggests that this effect may be explained by better monitoring practices rather than by less effective control or a "taste for continuity". JEL-Classification: G34, J24, J63, L25, M00

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The influence of top management corporate networks on CEO succession

Cited by 14 publications

References 59 publications

Competition, Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

Competition, Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

Executive Turnover and Outside Directors on Two-Tiered Boards

Women on the Board and Executive Duration Evidence for European Listed Firms

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