2016
DOI: 10.1002/mde.2781
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Competition, Outside Directors and Executive Turnover: Implications for Corporate Governance in the EU

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0
1

Year Published

2017
2017
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
8
1

Relationship

1
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 12 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 114 publications
(165 reference statements)
0
3
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…The effectiveness of busy directors has long been controversial and received considerable attention (Buchwald, 2017). Substantial research has investigated both the potential benefits and negative consequences derived from having busy directors on corporate boards.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The effectiveness of busy directors has long been controversial and received considerable attention (Buchwald, 2017). Substantial research has investigated both the potential benefits and negative consequences derived from having busy directors on corporate boards.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, the separation of ownership and management may provide some problems for companies, including conflict of interest and information asymmetry between manager and shareholder (Teixeira, 2012;Jiraporn et al 2012). These problems are due to showing opportunistic behavior by managers, including their concentration on self-interests, excessive use of capital, and inappropriate investment decisions (Buchwald, 2016). The opportunistic behaviors of management depend on the amount of management power and its credit in companies (Stagliano and Racca and Recca, 2014).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Empirical research has provided some evidence that monitoring can have a strong impact on managerial and organizational performance. For instance, studies show that independent supervisory boards increase management turnover (Buchwald, 2017), reduce risk-taking (Eling and Marek, 2014) and exercise better capital control in the company (Balsmeier et al, 2015). However, research has also shown that the extent of monitoring varies greatly across companies (Van den Berghe and Baelden, 2005).…”
Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%