The influence of neoliberalization on the success and failure of fishing cooperatives in contemporary small-scale fishing communities: A case study from Yucatán, Mexico

Governing the commons beyond harvesting: An empirical illustration from fishing

“…In Mexico a long and continuing history of cooperatives and collectivism across economic sectors coupled with recent transitions in the 1990s away from State interventionism toward private sector investment has given rise to a context in which fishing cooperatives and patronclient relationships coexist and compete for labor, market power, and fisheries resources [28]. During the first half of the 20 th century, fisheries development in Mexico focused on the promotion of social interests and equitable distribution of resources [29][30][31].…”

“…The formal legal framework shifted concurrently. Amendments in 1992 to Mexico's constitution made inshore resources available for private sector fishing permits through competitive bidding processes [28] and the 1994 fisheries law eliminated cooperatives' exclusive access to some valuable species [32]. These changes opened opportunities for individuals and private firms to play a more prominent role in the control of capital and property rights in fisheries as well as the commercialization and marketing of fisheries products.…”

“…Bahia de Kino has a population of around 6,000 people, most of whom are dependent directly or indirectly on fishing, and it is estimated there are around 200 boats harvesting 66 species of fish and shellfish throughout the year [38]. Rio Lagartos's population of~5,000 people is also highly dependent upon small-scale fishing, with about half of the~600 fishers working for patron-client relationships and the other half for fishing cooperatives [28]. Fishers in Rio Lagartos also harvest a wide variety of species including snapper/grouper and other finfish, spiny lobster, octopus, and sea cucumber.…”

“…Previous modeling and empirical work have shown cooperatives can build more trust because they cannot exchange their members as frequently as patron-client relationships [44]. Patron-client relationships' lower transaction costs of entering and exiting the arrangement allows them to accumulate more reliable fishers faster than cooperatives, yet have a lower success rate in keeping reliable fishers within the arrangement than cooperatives [44,28].…”

“…The movement of fishers is a persistent source of conflict in fishing and has been extensively documented [47,48]. In the Yucatán Peninsula in Mexico, migratory labor can threaten the resilience of well-organized fishing associations, by stressing local fishers' ability to control access of migrant fishers to their common-pool resources [28,46], as well as the provision of other public goods like health and schooling available in rural coastal communities.…”