Governing the commons beyond harvesting: An empirical illustration from fishing

Abstract

Harvesting has received most theoretical, empirical, and policy attention towards understanding common-pool resource dilemmas. Yet, pre-harvesting and post-harvesting activities influence harvesting outcomes as well. Broadening the analytical focus beyond harvesting is needed to imagine new ways of theorizing and governing the commons. Fishing-which is synonymous with harvesting-is a case in point. We contribute to a beyondharvesting research agenda by incorporating concepts from common-pool resources theory that have not received enough attention in the literature. We compare two ubiquitous selforganizing strategies (i.e., fishing cooperatives and patron-client relationships) fishers use to access means of production and analyze their effects on the distribution of benefits resulting from harvesting. We use rarely available longitudinal data of monetary loans to fishers in Mexican small-scale fisheries and find that cooperatives can deliver broader distribution of benefits than patron-client relationships. Our study highlights the importance of historically and contextually situating analyses linking the effects of pre-harvesting processes on harvesting outcomes, and the benefits of broadening the scope of inquiry beyond a narrow policy attention on harvesting to move towards a fuller understanding of commons dilemmas.

Fish provision in a changing environment: The buffering effect of regional trade networks

“…In addition, we highlight how traders can have different roles depending on their connectivity patterns. Understanding the different roles of traders will be key to better account for traders and post-harvesting activities in fisheries decision-making processes [ 15 , 22 , 78 ].…”

“…Trade relationships in SSF commonly take place in local and regional networks of traders [ 15 , 18 – 20 ], where trade is embedded in networks of social relationships [ 21 ]. Thus trade relationships in SSF are often interlinked with other social processes and relationships such as kinship, assistance, or informal institutions [ 20 , 22 ]. There are numerous examples describing stable relationships between fishers (producers) and traders as embedded in institutional arrangements often named patron-client relationships, which involve loans, loyalty or commitment, reciprocity, and/or the exchange of different goods and services (e.g., [ 22 – 25 ]).…”

“…Thus trade relationships in SSF are often interlinked with other social processes and relationships such as kinship, assistance, or informal institutions [ 20 , 22 ]. There are numerous examples describing stable relationships between fishers (producers) and traders as embedded in institutional arrangements often named patron-client relationships, which involve loans, loyalty or commitment, reciprocity, and/or the exchange of different goods and services (e.g., [ 22 – 25 ]). The same type of arrangements have been found between traders in regional supply chains [ 8 , 20 ].…”

Recognize fish as food in policy discourse and development funding

“…For example, important policy objectives include protecting fishing access rights for small-scale fishers, addressing power relations in fish value chains that disadvantage small-scale fish workers-many of whom are women-and ensuring that export markets support broadbased development and not just highly capitalized firms. The distribution of capital and property rights to harvest and produce fish is an essential consideration in promoting equitable nutrition and livelihood benefits from fish value chains, especially given the tight links between harvesting and post-harvesting institutions in large-and small-scale commercial fisheries Basurto et al 2020). A gendered approach to policy development is a crucial cross-cutting perspective linking fish production, post-harvest processing and trade, and household nutritional outcomes, as women play important roles in fisheries and aquaculture sectors but are often underrepresented and marginalized in research and policy (Harper et al 2013).…”

Social-ecological networks and connectivity within and between two communities of small-scale fishers in Mexico

“…Like most small-scale fisheries around the world, MIR fisheries are generally self-governed through informal arrangements under cooperative or non-cooperative structures, which translates to cooperatives versus a patron-client arrangement (Lindkvist et al 2017). To gain fishing access, fishers either work for patrons or as part of cooperatives, with both typically commercializing their catches through intermediaries (Cinti et al 2014, Basurto et al 2020. Although fishers are most incentivized to join cooperatives when they live in communities with high transaction costs for selling and commercializing their catch, governance arrangements seem to develop depending on their social-ecological fit, and potential for adaptation to variability (Basurto et al 2013a).…”