The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating

Abstract

In this study, we experimentally analyze the effectiveness of payoff‐irrelevant peer‐to‐peer ratings as a cooperation enforcement device in a finitely repeated public goods game setting. We run two treatments that differ in the amount of information on own and others' received rating points provided to the players, whereas, in a third treatment, we analyze peer approval when assigning ratings to others is costly. In particular, we wonder whether, even under anonymity and in the absence of reputational concerns, (a) players rate others' contribution decisions in the expected direction and (b) the peer rating mechanisms under study foster cooperation and welfare. Our findings reveal that, in the two costless rating treatments, peer rating concerns lead to higher contributions and efficiency, compared to our control. Introducing a small fixed cost for assigning rating points results in a very high percentage of subjects deciding not to rate others' behavior, so that cooperation cannot be enforced.

The Influence of Social Reward on Cooperative Behaviour in Teams: An Experimental Research

“…At present, studies on the impact of social reward on team cooperation mainly include three categories: the rst category empirically measures the peer control climate (including social reward and social punishment climate) of the team in the workplace and examines its impact on cooperation 6,7,8,9 . The second category mainly uses the laboratory experiment method to compare the difference in the cooperation level between the two conditions with and without social reward to test its effect 10,11,12 . The third category compares the effects of social and monetary reward, or social reward and social punishment on cooperation 13,14,15 .…”

An introduction to the second special issue commemorating works of James Andreoni, Theodore Bergstrom, Larry Blume, and Hal Varian

“…Another question concerning cooperation is how it can be achieved within an organization. Failo, Grieco, and Zarri (2020) present and experimentally analyze the effectiveness of payoff‐irrelevant peer‐to‐peer ratings as a cooperation enforcement device in a finitely repeated public goods game setting. They run two treatments that differ in the amount of information on own and others' received rating points provided to the players, whereas, in a third treatment, they analyze peer approval when assigning ratings to others is costly.…”

Introduction to the JPET special issues commemorating works of James Andreoni, Theodore Bergstrom, Larry Blume, and Hal Varian

“…One of the main findings is that there is an increase in payoffs by starting with small stakes, and this increase is larger when the allocation is chosen by the players themselves; participation in the allocation decision encourages higher contribution levels. Other papers in these special issues dealing with cooperation include Brent, Gangadharan, Mihut, and Villeval (2019), Cartwright, Stepanova, and Xue (2019), Colasante et al (2019), Faillo, Grieco, and Zarri (2019), and Théroude and Zylbersztejn (2019). Brent et al (2019) considers an experiment in a nonlinear common pool resource game with heterogeneous players who have unequal extraction possibilities and have to decide on what will be extracted from the common pool.…”

“…This result illustrates the difficulties of enacting behavioral interventions as their effects are typically context dependent. For instance, in the next issue, Faillo et al (2019) demonstrate that the information of the approval of one's peers, as opposed to their actions, can promote contributions to a public good. Colasante et al (2019) also consider an experiment of a social dilemma where players benefit unequally from cooperation.…”

“…One of the main findings is that there is an increase in payoffs by starting with small stakes, and this increase is larger when the allocation is chosen by the players themselves; participation in the allocation decision encourages higher contribution levels. Other papers in these special issues dealing with cooperation include Brent, Gangadharan, Mihut, and Villeval (), Cartwright, Stepanova, and Xue (), Colasante et al (), Faillo, Grieco, and Zarri (), and Théroude and Zylbersztejn ().…”