Creativity is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon with tremendous economic importance. A crucial question for economists and for firms is the interplay of incentives and creativity. We present experiments where subjects face creativity tasks where, in one case, ex-ante goals and constraints are imposed on their answers ("closed" tasks), and in the other case no restrictions apply ("open" tasks). The effect of tournament incentives on creativity is then tested. Our experimental findings provide striking evidence that financial incentives in the form of tournament competition affect creativity in "closed" (constrained) tasks, but do not facilitate creativity in "open" (unconstrained) tasks, whereas being ranked relative to one's peers is an effective non-monetary incentive with both types of tasks. We develop a structural model that allows for subjects' heterogeneity in being affected by the openness of the task, and then use the structural model to not only estimate creative output in tournaments but also to predict creative output in two counterfactual incentives schemes: piece rate and target bonus.
In dealing with peer punishment as a cooperation enforcement device, laboratory studies have typically concentrated on discretionary sanctioning, allowing players to castigate each other arbitrarily. While such 'vigilante justice' turns out to enhance cooperation when retaliation is prohibited, this comes at a substantial cost, as welfare levels are usually low. By contrast, in real life punishments are often meted out only insofar as punishers are entitled to punish and punishees deserve to be punished. We provide an experimental test for this 'legitimate punishment' institution in the framework of a public goods game, by comparing it with a discretionary punishment mechanism. Our findings show that, despite the lack of additional monetary incentives and the risk to produce motivation crowding-out effects on subjects' propensity to cooperate, the introduction of legitimate punishment leads to substantial efficiency gains. Further, players' earnings are significantly higher. We also focus on the role of feedback and we interestingly find that removing the information over high contributors' choices only leads to a dramatic decline in cooperation rates and earnings. This interaction result implies that providing feedback over virtuous behavior in the group is necessary to make an institution based on legitimate punishment effective.
a b s t r a c tStudies have found that people are overconfident in estimation involving difficult tasks but underconfident in easy tasks. Conversely, they are overconfident in placing themselves in easy tasks but underconfident in hard tasks. These findings can be explained by a regression hypothesis that implies random errors in estimation as well as by rational Bayesian updating (that implies no random error). We test these hypotheses in five experiments. We find overconfidence in estimation involving hard tasks but underconfidence in easy tasks. However, for placement (involving both easy and hard tasks) we find no overconfidence, regression effects due to low and high anchor points, and extreme underconfidence when people choose between multiple alternatives. On the other hand, when given precise information about absolute performance, people's re-assessments of relative performance are consistent with the Bayesian model. Since placement judgments are important in many competitive settings, our results emphasize the need for more research to identify their determinants.
Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' “empirical” or “normative” expectations. We propose a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms.
Umbilical cord blood is a source of hematopoietic stem cells essential to treat life-threatening diseases, such as leukemia and lymphoma. However, only a very small percentage of parents donate upon delivery. The decision to donate the cord blood occurs at a very specific time and when parents likely experience emotional, informational, and decisional overloads; these features of cord blood donation make it different from other pro-social activities. In collaboration with an OB-GYN clinic in Milan, Italy, we conducted the first randomized controlled trial that applies tools from behavioral science to foster cord blood donation, and quantified the gains that informational and behavioral “nudges” can achieve. We found that information and “soft” commitments increased donations; approaching expecting parents closer to the delivery date and providing them with multiple reminders, moreover, had the strongest impact. However, a significant portion of women who expressed consent to donate could not do so because of organizational constraints. We conclude that simple, non-invasive behavioral interventions that address information gaps and procrastination, and that increase the salience of the activity can substantially enhance altruistic donations of cord blood, especially when coupled with organizational support.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.