The Human in Command

Abstract

AII nghts reservedNo part of thls book may be reproduced, stored m a retneval system, or transmltted m any form ar by any means, electromc, mechamcal, photocopymg, microfilmmg, recordmg, or otherwlse, wlthout wntten permlSSlOn from the Pubhsher FOREWORD MAJOR-GENERAL M. K. JEFFERYCommand, and mdeed the human in command, has always been key to milItary operations. The complexIty and tempo of modern operations make this statement even more true today than in the past. However, both the military and the research communities have tended to treat command and control (C 2 ) from a limited perspective. For too long, command and control have been considered as if they were a single concept, with control often dominatmg our study. Indeed, in many cases we have divorced operational C 2 from the military institution itself, resulting in disconnects and inefficiencies. Then, in an attempt to overcome these self-inflicted deficiencies, we have pursued the Holy Grail of technology, hoping that it would solve our C 2 problems. Only now, as we start to realize technology's costs and limitations, are we looking critically at C 2 • This book attempts to take such a look. The contributions that make up this book are the product of a June 1998 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) workshop called The Human m Command. Far from being purely an academIc exercise, this gathenng brought together milItary leaders and civilian scientists to discuss C 2 's central pragmatic and conceptual issues-its assumptions, its practices, and its organization. Indeed, in recent years there has been mounting evidence that both our society and Its military institutions are facing organizational crises. In the introduction to her 1992 book Leadership and the New SCience, Margaret Wheatley eloquently expresses the widely shared bewilderment and concern about this problem:I am not alone m wondenng why orgamzatlOns aren't workmg well Many of us are troubled by questIOns that haunt our work Why do so many orgamzatlOns feel dead? Why do projects take so long, develop ever·greater compleXIty, yet so often fat! to achieve any truly slgmficant results? Why does progress, when It appears, so often come from unexpected places, or as a result of surpnses or serendipitous events that our planning had not considered? Why does change Itself, that event we're all supposed to be "managmg," keep drowmng us, relentlessly reducmg any sense of mastery we rmght possess? And why have our expectatIOns for success dimmished to the pomt that often MAJOR· GENERAL M K JEFFERY. 1st CanadIan DIVISIOn, PO Box 17000, Station Forces, Kmgston, OntarIO, Canada K7K 7B4 Vl Foreword the best we hope for IS staymg power and patience to endure the disruptive forces that appear unpredictably m the orgamzatIons where we work? (p. 1) Militaries around the world are living, on a daily basis, with the failings of our current approaches to command and control. The basic organizational models used by milItary forces have not changed m more than a century. Although the demands and complex...