The Hobbesian Trap

Baliga, Sandeep; Sjöström, Tomas

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0005

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(46 reference statements)

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“…56 In a 2001 study, Baliga and Sjostrom applied the Nash Equilibrium to arms races and found stability largely depended on a player's type, which was informed by 'private information.' 57 Ecology is a wholly different field that uses the concept of strategic stability to describe a balance in nature, defined as, 'the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance.' 58 Similar to mathematics, stability is closely tied to the concept of equilibrium.…”

Section: Dynamic Stabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles

Williams¹

2021

Emerging Technologies and International Stability

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Section: Dynamic Stabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles

Williams¹

2021

Emerging Technologies and International Stability

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“…Its use is often followed by outbreaks of moral controversy and indignation, potential solutions, and of personal conversion to the many different causes [5]. Furthermore, it tends to engender a global, overarching, and nonspecific response, or hobbesian error [6], verses a more strategic and data-based, response. Thus, the opioid epidemic became not only a 'war on drugs', but a 'war on opioids'.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Cognitive Biases in the Prescribing and Deprescribing of Opioids

Doleys¹

2022

Curr Res Psychol Behav Sc

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The policies and guidelines which have shaped the attitude and practice relating to the use of opioids for the treatment of chronic pain have undergone remarkable changes. Recent decades have witnessed a surge, followed by a decline, and near prohibition, in the use of opioids. Cognitive biases appeared to be play an important role in how the scientific data upon which policy and guidelines are based is presented, and interpreted. These biases may have had a greater influence on policymakers than the data itself. This paper reviews data from four key areas identified as relating to the use of opioids, and the creation of guidelines including (a) the surge and decline in opioid prescribing, (b) sham distinctions, (c) reliance on the numerical pain rating (NPR) and (d) the consequences associated with the use/discontinuation of opioids. Published studies, commentaries, and guidelines were selected based on their ability to illustrate a particular bias and/or to highlight discrepancies in the scientific literature. Discrepancies and inconsistences in the presentation and interpretation of data in these areas were identified. Focused illusion, linguistic uncertainty, and heuristic failure were found to be prevalent cognitive biases. Cognitive biases appear to be influential in the making of policy and guidelines related to the sue of opioids. Overlooking these biases may result in decisions that negatively impact clinical practice and patient safety

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Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model

Acemoğlu

Wolitzky

2012

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We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of "extremists" who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be mistakenly perceived as bad/distrusting actions. We also assume that there is limited information about the history of past actions, so that an agent is unable to ascertain exactly when and how a sequence of bad actions originated. Assuming that both sides are not extremists, spirals of distrust and conflict get started as a result of a misperception, and continue because the other side interprets the bad action as evidence that it is facing extremists. However, such spirals contain the seeds of their own dissolution: after a while, Bayesian agents correctly conclude that the probability of a spiral having started by mistake is sufficiently high, and bad actions are no longer interpreted as evidence of extremism. At this point, one party experiments with a good action, and the cycle restarts. We show how this mechanism can be useful in interpreting cycles of ethnic conflict and international war, and how it also emerges in models of political participation, dynamic inter-group trade, and communication-leading to cycles of political polarization, breakdown of trade, and breakdown of communication.

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The Hobbesian Trap

Cited by 3 publications

References 18 publications

Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles

Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles

The Role of Cognitive Biases in the Prescribing and Deprescribing of Opioids

Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model

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