The Hidden Logic of Candidate Selection for Chilean Parliamentary Elections

Siavelis, Peter M.

doi:10.2307/4146946

Cited by 50 publications

(44 citation statements)

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“…Gender quotas must be considered as a reform in the way parties choose their candidates, in the context of discussions about other measures to democratize party rules. In making connections among gender quotas, primary elections, and candidate nominations more generally, I have sought to shed light on the candidate recruitment process, a phenomenon that, until recently, has received scant scholarly attention (but see Gallagher and Marsh 1988;Norris 1997;Norris and Lovenduski 1995;Siavelis 2002). I have proposed hypotheses that should be examined across a range of cases, including countries that have not adopted quotas (for example, see Crocker 2003).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico

Baldez

2004

Legislative Studies Qtrly

165

149

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In the past decade, 21 countries have adopted gender quota laws that require between 20% and 50% of all legislative candidates to be women. What explains the adoption of these laws? I argue that three factors make politicians more likely to adopt gender quota laws. First, electoral uncertainty creates an opportunity for internal party reform that factions within a party can exploit to their advantage. Second, the courts play an important role because of the centrality of the issue of equal protection under the law to gender quotas. Finally, cross‐partisan mobilization among female legislators raises the costs of opposing such legislation by drawing public attention to it. I examine these three claims with regard to Mexico, where the federal congress passed a 30% gender quota law in 2002. I'd give up my seat for you if it wasn't for the fact that I'm sitting in it myself. —Groucho Marx (quoted in Abdela 2001) [Many Latin American countries] have ‘homosexual’ political systems, that is, the power of the political parties and the state is in the hands of only one of the sexes.… —Line Bareiro, Paraguayan feminist (Bareiro and Soto 1992, 11)

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico

Baldez

2004

Legislative Studies Qtrly

165

149

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“…Scholars have debated various aspects of strategic coordination, including why parties adopt particular nomination strategies (Browne and Patterson 1999; Christensen and Johnson 1995; Cox 1997; Cox and Niou 1994; Reed 1995), how political parties select candidates for party lists (Siavelis 2002), and how party nomination strategies lead to legislative majorities (Shvetsova 2002). In mixed electoral systems, parties are faced with many choices about strategic entry and nomination of candidates: should they contest elections in both tiers independently, in formal coalitions with other parties, in informal coalitions with other parties, or should they abstain from electoral competition altogether? 1 In this article, we are particularly interested in evaluating pre‐electoral coordination in the majoritarian component of the election.…”

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confidence: 99%

Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules

Ferrara¹,

Herron²

2004

American J Political Sci

104

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Recent studies on strategic voting and entry in elections that combine plurality or majority and proportional representation (PR) have found candidate placement in single-member district (SMD) races to improve a party's PR performance. The primary implication of the existence of "contamination effects" is that parties have an incentive to nominate candidates in as many single-member districts as possible. Pre-electoral coordination in the majoritarian component of mixed electoral systems, however, is far from uncommon. In this article, we identify a number of institutional incentives that induce political parties to form pre-electoral alliances in spite of contamination effects. By identifying institutions that favor and hamper coordination, we seek to advance the understanding of PR-SMD interactions and to assess their implications for the design, classification, and empirical analysis of mixed electoral rules. Our statistical tests evaluate strategic entry in a diverse sample of countries.

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“…Lagos subsequently became President of Chile. A similarly instructive example from congressional district 19 (Santiago) can be found in Siavelis (, p. 421).…”

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confidence: 88%

What Should (Knightian) Economists Do? James M. Buchanan's 1980 Visit to Chile

Farrant

2019

Southern Economic Journal

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Although Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger became involved with Pinochet's Chile in the mid‐1970s, an increasingly influential body of scholarship argues that James M. Buchanan was similarly eager to provide Pinochet's dictatorship with advice. Buchanan reportedly had a heavy influence on the development of Chile's 1980 Constitution and similarly helped to design Chile's binomial electoral system. Buchanan's seeming willingness to advise Pinochet's dictatorship provides a stark contrast to his longstanding advocacy of Frank Knight's view that democracy is “government by discussion” and Buchanan's oft‐repeated insistence that democratic consensus trumps economic expertise. This article draws upon a wealth of largely ignored archival evidence and Chilean primary source material to engage and evaluate whether Buchanan—a Knightian economist par excellence—abandoned his advocacy of “government by discussion” and provided early 1980s advice that helped Pinochet's regime of “institutionalized terror” (Valdes , p. 30) design a constitution that would chain any subsequent Chilean democracy.

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The Hidden Logic of Candidate Selection for Chilean Parliamentary Elections

Cited by 50 publications

References 0 publications

Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico

Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico

Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules

What Should (Knightian) Economists Do? James M. Buchanan's 1980 Visit to Chile

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