The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order

Abstract

The historical proximity between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa has in recent years been increasingly experienced as a relationship of growing insecurity. Gulf States have rapidly expanded their economic and political roles on the other side of the Red Sea and have established military bases. This article argues that this interventionist thrust is historically rooted and deeply structural: the politics of state survival that dominate both the Gulf and the Horn are leading aspiring regional hegemons with a self-proclaimed responsibility to provide order to securitise their near abroad. Originating from the self-identity of regional powers and efforts to protect their respective domestic political settlements, this is producing a profoundly destabilising pattern of regional polarisation.

The impact of the Middle East and Gulf states' involvement on the Horn of Africa's peace and security: Applying regional security complex theory

“…Although the relationship between the HoA and the Middle East has a long history, the current increasing involvement of the Middle East states in Horn is intense and profound (Marsai & Szalai, 2021). Particularly since the 2011 Arab Spring, the Middle East states' projects to protect and aspire to regional leadership around the Red Sea region have shaped regional security in the HoA (Verhoeven, 2018). The critical question is why the Middle Eastern states are becoming more involved in the Horn than ever before.…”

“…Beyond the diplomatic breakup with Iran, Sudan, and Eritrea were providing military assistance to Saudi Arabia, including the deployment of ground forces (Informant 01 Interview, February 6, 2023). Thousands of Eritrean and Sudanese ground forces have been deployed in Yemen to fight the Houthis alongside the Saudi-led coalition (Verhoeven, 2018).…”

“…According to Cannon and Donelli (2019), the Middle East and the HoA are two distinct RSCs, but they share a high level of security interdependence. Verhoeven (2018) also described the Middle East and the HoA regions as interdependent in terms of security. For Cannon and Donelli (2019), the two RECs not only share similar security interests, concerns, and threat perceptions but they also have similar security and political consequences.…”

Against All Odds? Blue Economy and Blue Ocean Maritime Strategy in Seychelles and Mauritius

“…In 2012, the EU proposed a "Blue Growth" strategy aimed at economic development of marine policies, according to Europe's oceans, seas and coasts (Vuori 2022). Verhoeven (2018) explore the "Blue Economy Innovation Plan" that the EU launched in 2014 which targeted three main aspects: the development of sectors promoting sustainable jobs and growth; vital element which will offer "knowledge, legal certainty and security" in its Blue Economy; and strategies that will provide specific courses of action and "foster cooperation" between the nations.…”

Overcoming smallness: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and strategic realignment in the Gulf

“…The fact that so many facilities in the Western Indian Ocean especially (Aden, Assab, Berbera) have dual use capabilities and are allowing the UAE to have a naval and air force presence alongside its commercial interests displeases land-locked regional powers like Ethiopia which fear near-total Emirati dominance of import and export routes, underpinned by military support for its historical enemies in Eritrea and Somalia. 56 Recent changes in Ethiopia's political leadership with the rise of Premier Abiy Ahmed have allowed Addis and Abu Dhabi to reset relations and attempt pragmatic cooperation, but the assertive-cum-aggressive Emirati geo-economic push remains a difficult proposition in the Horn of Africa. 57 The DP World vision explains why the UAE has been the most active Gulf player in anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, as well as the most persistent intervener in Somali domestic politics.…”