Overcoming smallness: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and strategic realignment in the Gulf

Abstract

Geography and the anarchic state system incentivise the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar to collaborate in managing the threat posed by being neighbours of two (aspiring) regional hegemons, Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, both small states have responded very differently to the causes and consequences of instability in the Gulf region and developed very different foreign policies to deal with their structural IR problem. Just how divergent their external relations now are is clearly seen in the UAE's lead role in the diplomatic boycott and economic embargo launched against Qatar in June 2017-including the de facto dissolution of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Framing our examination in the theoretical literature on small states, we explain the ultimately colliding foreign policy trajectories of the UAE and Qatar in terms of diverging ideational and strategic considerations in the cause of what we term 'overcoming smallness'.

The Gulf Cooperation Council states: Crystallization of the regional cooperation and alliances amid dwindling resources

“…Qatar provided strong financial and economic support to Egypt's first democratic government after Hosni Mubarak was removed from power in 2011 (Young, 2017). The country supported revolutionary movements in Tunis, Libya, and Syria by sending money and military equipment whenever possible (Miller & Verhoeven, 2020). Qatar's close economic and political relationship with Turkey intensified due to evolving regional dynamics (Başkan & Pala, 2020).…”

“…The country has abundant oil and gas reserves (Figure 1) and overseas investments exceeding one trillion USD (Figure 2) compared to its relatively small population of 1 million citizens and 9 million non‐citizen residents (Kaya & Tsai, 2016). Qatar pursues a policy to uphold the status quo both inside and outside of Qatar since 2011 (Miller & Verhoeven, 2020). The fall of the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Libyan autocrats rang alarm bells in Abu Dhabi (Charrad & Reith, 2019).…”

Entrusted norms: security, trust, and betrayal in the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis

“…It helps us to understand why this crisis happened and why reconciliation has been so difficult. We argue that the problem with current analyses of the crisis lies in the fact that realist scholars have continued to focus on traditional international security problems, that is, the way that alliances suffer from problems of potential abandonment and entrapment, struggles for sovereignty and independence, and whether the alliance members themselves fear each other militarily (Bilgin, 2018; Mason, 2014; Miller and Verhoeven, 2020). This view, however, does not account for an equally pressing security problem that Gulf States face: that of internal regime security (Barnett and Gause III, 1998: 162; Bianco and Stansfield, 2018; Bilgin, 2018: 118; Guzansky, 2014: 640).…”

‘Writing’ small states: contextualizing the construct in the Arab Gulf

“…Qatar and the UAE have focused on the development of specific capacities (FIFA infrastructure, luxury shopping, museums), while other basic domestic capacities remain arguably underdeveloped (scientific and medical expertise, democratic governance). A recent comparison between Qatar and the UAE's strategies geared at 'overcoming smallness' characterizes Qatar's 'Al Jazeera World' path as dependent on soft power, diplomacy, and mediation, contrasted with a UAE 'DP Effect' enacted in commercial takeovers via ports (Miller and Verhoeven 2020). While variations certainly exist between the two Gulf small states' foreign policies, much is left unsaid.…”