2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2013.06.024
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The growth of a shadow banking system in emerging markets: Evidence from India

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Cited by 73 publications
(38 citation statements)
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“…Shadow banking can complement traditional banking activity by enlarging access to credit, sustaining liquidity, and enabling better risk sharing, both in developing and advanced economies (Ghosh et al 2012;Acharya et al 2013;Gennaioli et al 2013;Meeks et al 2013). Indeed, shadow banking entities can conduct either all three or any one of the typical banking functions: maturity, credit and liquidity transformation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Shadow banking can complement traditional banking activity by enlarging access to credit, sustaining liquidity, and enabling better risk sharing, both in developing and advanced economies (Ghosh et al 2012;Acharya et al 2013;Gennaioli et al 2013;Meeks et al 2013). Indeed, shadow banking entities can conduct either all three or any one of the typical banking functions: maturity, credit and liquidity transformation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, if firms, banks, and non-banks are distributed uniformly across the country and firms choose their lenders randomly, on average, non-banks become located farther away from their customers due to the relatively small number of non-bank branches in the credit market. Although Petersen and Rajan (2002) examine whether lender type predicts distance to borrowers, this may not differentiate the effect of distinct lending practices 1 This paper excludes venture capitalists here since lending practices of venture capitalists might be signicantly different from non-bank financial institutions.…”
Section: Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, in securitization shadow banking strips assets of credit and liquidity risks through tranching and providing liquidity puts (Pozsar et al 2010;Gennaioli et al 2012). Or it facilitates the use of collateral to reduce counterparty exposures in repo markets and for OTC derivatives (Gorton 2012;Acharya and Öncü 2013).…”
Section: B Why Do Shadow Banking Activities Always Rely On a Backstop?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another is public -by using explicit or implicit government guarantees. Examples include, besides the general implicit guarantee provided to the "too-big-to-fail," large banks active in shadow banking, the Federal Reserve securities lending facility (TSLF) that backstops the collateral intermediation processes, the implicit too-big-to-fail guarantees for tri-party repo clearing banks and other dealer banks , the bankruptcy stay exemptions for repos which in effect guarantee the exposure of lenders (Perotti, 2013), or the implicit, reputational and other guarantees on bank-affiliated products (as widely described in the press regarding so called "wealth management products" in China; Lardy, 2013) or on liabilities of non-bank finance companies (as noted for India; Acharya et al, 2013).…”
Section: B Why Do Shadow Banking Activities Always Rely On a Backstop?mentioning
confidence: 99%