This paper solves explicitly a simple equilibrium model with liquidity risk. In our liquidityadjusted capital asset pricing model, a security's required return depends on its expected liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return and liquidity. In addition, a persistent negative shock to a security's liquidity results in low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. The model provides a unified framework for understanding the various channels through which liquidity risk may affect asset prices. Our empirical results shed light on the total and relative economic significance of these channels and provide evidence of flight to liquidity. r

We present an economic model of systemic risk in which undercapitalization of the financial sector as a whole is assumed to harm the real economy, leading to a systemic risk externality. Each financial institution's contribution to systemic risk can be measured as its systemic expected shortfall (SES ), that is, its propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized. SES increases in the institution's leverage and its marginal expected shortfall (MES ), that is, its losses in the tail of the system's loss distribution. We demonstrate empirically the ability of components of SES to predict emerging systemic risk during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.We would like to thank Rob Engle for many useful discussions. We are grateful to Christian Brownlees, Farhang Farazmand, Hanh Le and Tianyue Ruan for excellent research assistance. We also received useful comments from Tobias Adrian, Mark Carey, Matthias Drehman, Dale Gray and Jabonn Kim (discussants), Andrew Karolyi (editor), and seminar participants at several central banks and universities where the current paper and related systemic risk rankings at vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk have been presented. Pedersen gratefully acknowledges support from the European Research Council (ERC grant no. 312417) and the FRIC Center for Financial Frictions (grant no. DNRF102).

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has given way to the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2012, yet many of the banking issues remain the same. We discuss a method to estimate the capital that a financial firm would need to raise if we have another financial crisis. This measure of capital shortfall is based on publicly available information but is conceptually similar to the stress tests conducted by US and European regulators. We argue that this measure summarizes the major characteristics of systemic risk and provides a reliable interpretation of the past and current financial crises.

We show that financial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked. A bailout benefits the economy by ameliorating the under-investment problem of the financial sector. However, increasing taxation of the non-financial sector to fund the bailout may be inefficient since it weakens its incentive to invest, decreasing growth. Instead, the sovereign may choose to fund the bailout by diluting existing government bondholders, resulting in a deterioration of the sovereign's creditworthiness. This deterioration feeds back to the financial sector, reducing the value of its guarantees and existing bond holdings as well as increasing its sensitivity to future sovereign shocks. We provide empirical evidence for this two-way feedback between financial and sovereign credit risk using data on the credit default swaps (CDS) of the Eurozone countries and their banks for 2007-11. We show that the announcement of financial sector bailouts was associated with an immediate, unprecedented widening of sovereign CDS spreads and narrowing of bank CDS spreads; however, post-bailouts there emerged a significant co-movement between bank CDS and sovereign CDS, even after controlling for banks' equity performance, the latter being consistent with an effect of the quality of sovereign guarantees on bank credit risk. * We are grateful to Stijn Claessens, Ilan Kremer,

We model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints. While saving cash allows constrained firms to hedge against future cash flow shortfalls, reducing current debt -"saving borrowing capacity" -is a more effective way of securing investment in high cash flow states. This trade-off implies that constrained firms will allocate cash flows into cash holdings if their hedging needs are high (i.e., if the correlation between operating cash flows and investment opportunities is low). Those same firms, however, will use free cash flows to reduce current debt if their hedging needs are low. The empirical examination of debt and cash policies of a large sample of firms reveals evidence that is consistent with our theory. In particular, our evidence shows that financially constrained firms with high hedging needs have a strong propensity to save cash out of cash flows while leaving their debt positions unchanged. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs direct most of their free cash flows towards debt reduction, as opposed to cash savings. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind standard financial policies such as cash and debt management. It suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt.Key words: Cash holdings, debt policies, hedging, financing constraints, risk management JEL classification: G31 *We thank Yakov Amihud, Patrick Bolton, Julian Franks, Mitch Petersen, and Henri Servaes for their comments and suggestions. We also received valuable comments from seminar participants at Columbia University, Duke University, London Business School, Northwestern University, and the University of Washington at St. Louis. The usual disclaimer applies. Is Cash Negative Debt? A Hedging Perspective on Corporate Financial Policies AbstractWe model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints. While saving cash allows constrained firms to hedge against future cash flow shortfalls, reducing current debt -"saving borrowing capacity" -is a more effective way of securing investment in high cash flow states. This trade-off implies that constrained firms will allocate cash flows into cash holdings if their hedging needs are high (i.e., if the correlation between operating cash flows and investment opportunities is low). Those same firms, however, will use free cash flows to reduce current debt if their hedging needs are low. The empirical examination of debt and cash policies of a large sample of firms reveals evidence that is consistent with our theory. In particular, our evidence shows that financially constrained firms with high hedging needs have a strong propensity to save cash out of cash flows while leaving their debt positions unchanged. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs direct most of their free cash flows towards debt reduction, as opposed to cash savings. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind standard financial policies such as cash and debt management. It s...

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Insider trading in the credit derivatives market has become a significant concern for regulators and participants. This paper attempts to quantify the problem. Using news reflected in the stock market as a benchmark for public information, we report evidence of significant incremental information revelation in the credit default swap (CDS) market under circumstances consistent with the use of non-public information by informed banks. Specifically, the information revelation occurs only for negative credit news and for entities that subsequently experience adverse shocks. Moreover the degree of advance information revelation increases with the number of banks that have lending/monitoring relations with a given firm, and this effect is robust to controls for non-informational trade. We find no evidence, however, that the degree of asymmetric information adversely affects prices or liquidity in either the equity or credit markets.

We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits which played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007-09. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets while insuring the newly securitized assets using credit guarantees. The credit guarantees were structured to reduce bank capital requirements, while providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors. Consistent with such recourse, we find that banks with more exposure to conduits had lower stock returns at the start of the financial crisis; that during the first year of the crisis, asset-backed commercial paper spreads increased and issuance fell, especially for conduits with weaker credit guarantees and riskier banks; and that losses from conduits mostly remained with banks rather than outside investors. These results suggest that banks used this form of securitization to concentrate, rather than disperse, financial risks in the banking sector while reducing their capital requirements.