The Group of Twenty (G20)

Cooper, Andrew F.; Thakur, Ramesh

doi:10.4324/9780203071236

Cited by 106 publications

(54 citation statements)

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“…15, 18). Keohane and Underdal (, p. 60) similarly assert, “The transition from the G8 to the G20 as the principal forum for international economic coordination is a clear mark of the rise of certain developing countries to positions of economic preeminence.” David Held (, p. 204) believes it indicates “an unprecedented successful attempt by developing countries to extend their participation in key institutions of global governance.” As argued by Cooper and Thakur (, pp. 90–91), the G20 has become a hub of international cooperation and leadership on key issues.…”

Section: The G20 As a Partial Normative Community And Hub For Multilamentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Argentina's membership has not stopped its government from becoming an outsider, due to influential insiders' perceptions of its lack of adherence to appropriate economic–governance norms. By contrast, Singapore's nonmembership has not prevented its government from becoming an insider in post‐2008 multilateral cooperation, especially due to its role as convener of the Global Governance Group (3G) of 28 small developing and wealthy nations, which made the Singaporean government a crucial interlocutor for the G20 (see Chowdhury, ), as consultations with the 3G helped reduce perceptions of a “legitimacy gap” in G20 representation (Cooper, , p. 100–05; Cooper & Thakur, , pp. 95–97).…”

Section: Normative Effects Of the G20 And In‐group Recognition Of “Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Its membership of 19 countries plus the European Union accounted for approximately 85% of the world economy (G20, ). It became a “hub” of multilateral coordination (Cooper & Thakur, , pp. 90–91), liaising with and guiding activities of international financial institutions (IFIs) and fora, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS); Financial Stability Board (FSB); Bank for International Settlements; the IMF; and the World Bank (see Luckhurst, ).…”

Section: The G20 As a Partial Normative Community And Hub For Multilamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cooper and Mo () instead claim that “middle power leadership,” especially from Australia, Canada, and South Korea, has been crucial for the Leader forum. Others note that the forum demonstrates growing influence from the BRICS in the international economy (Cooper & Thakur, , pp. 15, 18).…”

Section: The G20 As a Partial Normative Community And Hub For Multilamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Latin America in the G20: Insiders or Outsiders?

Luckhurst¹

2015

Latin American Policy

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This article analyzes endogenous and exogenous constructions of the political identities of Latin American members of the G20, namely Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. It examines effects of G20 membership and other aspects of international relations, with a constructivist analysis of their political identities as "insiders" or "outsiders" in multilateral economic governance. G20 scholars note the forum's heterogeneity of coalitions on diverse issues, so policy divergence between the three governments is to be expected. This study focuses on the social construction of their identities in the G20, partly as a consequence of in-group perspectives and effects of the forum as what I call a "partial normative community." It analyzes official government statements; the consequences of international alliances, or lack thereof; policy objectives and agenda-setting activities, including Mexico's G20 Presidency in 2012; and overall participation of the three governments in multilateral cooperation since the 2008 financial crisis. I analyze similarities and differences between them, demonstrating the strategic consequences of political identity constructions in the G20.Este artículo analiza las construcciones endógenas y exógenas de las identidades políticas de los miembros latinoamericanos del G-20, específicamente Argentina, Brasil y México. En él se examinan los efectos de ser miembro del G-20 y otros aspectos de las relaciones internacionales, con un análisis constructivista de sus identidades políticas como "partícipes" o "excluidos" en la gobernanza económica multilateral. Los estudios sobre el G20 remarcan la heterogeneidad de las coaliciones sobre diversos temas en el foro, por lo que la divergencia política entre los tres gobiernos es de esperarse. Este estudio se centra en la construcción discursiva de sus identidades, en parte como consecuencia de las perspectivas del grupo de los partícipes y los efectos que el foro tiene en lo que yo llamo una "comunidad normativa parcial". Aquí se analizan las declaraciones oficiales de los gobiernos; las consecuencias de las alianzas internacionales, o la falta de ellas; los objetivos de las políticas y actividades establecidas en la agenda, incluyendo la Presidencia de México del G20 en 2012; y la participación global de los tres gobiernos en la cooperación multilateral desde la crisis financiera de 2008. Analizo las similitudes y diferencias entre ellos, demostrando las consecuencias estratégicas de las construcciones de identidad política en el G-20.

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Section: The G20 As a Partial Normative Community And Hub For Multilamentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Normative Effects Of the G20 And In‐group Recognition Of “Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The G20 As a Partial Normative Community And Hub For Multilamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The G20 As a Partial Normative Community And Hub For Multilamentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Latin America in the G20: Insiders or Outsiders?

Luckhurst¹

2015

Latin American Policy

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“…7 He had in mind of course not only 'BRICS' -anomalous in that they include two permanent members of the Security Council, one a former superpower and the other the world's second largest economy -but also a host of other abbreviations: BRIICS (BRICS plus Indonesia); BASIC (the BRICS minus Russia); IBSA (BRICS minus Russia and China); BRICSAM (BRICS plus Mexico); and MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey). And we should not forget the G20 (South Africa, Canada, the USA, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the European Union), 8 or the 3G Coalition that exists as part of an informal variable geometry to get the G20 to be more inclusive of non-member views. 9 These structures lend new weight to long-standing critiques of Western dominance over the global governance of economic and financial affairs, including development, and perhaps provide a way to bridge the North-South chasm or the West-versus-the-Rest divide.…”

Section: Some Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%