Latin America in the G20: Insiders or Outsiders?

Abstract

This article analyzes endogenous and exogenous constructions of the political identities of Latin American members of the G20, namely Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. It examines effects of G20 membership and other aspects of international relations, with a constructivist analysis of their political identities as "insiders" or "outsiders" in multilateral economic governance. G20 scholars note the forum's heterogeneity of coalitions on diverse issues, so policy divergence between the three governments is to be expected. This study focuses on the social construction of their identities in the G20, partly as a consequence of in-group perspectives and effects of the forum as what I call a "partial normative community." It analyzes official government statements; the consequences of international alliances, or lack thereof; policy objectives and agenda-setting activities, including Mexico's G20 Presidency in 2012; and overall participation of the three governments in multilateral cooperation since the 2008 financial crisis. I analyze similarities and differences between them, demonstrating the strategic consequences of political identity constructions in the G20.Este artículo analiza las construcciones endógenas y exógenas de las identidades políticas de los miembros latinoamericanos del G-20, específicamente Argentina, Brasil y México. En él se examinan los efectos de ser miembro del G-20 y otros aspectos de las relaciones internacionales, con un análisis constructivista de sus identidades políticas como "partícipes" o "excluidos" en la gobernanza económica multilateral. Los estudios sobre el G20 remarcan la heterogeneidad de las coaliciones sobre diversos temas en el foro, por lo que la divergencia política entre los tres gobiernos es de esperarse. Este estudio se centra en la construcción discursiva de sus identidades, en parte como consecuencia de las perspectivas del grupo de los partícipes y los efectos que el foro tiene en lo que yo llamo una "comunidad normativa parcial". Aquí se analizan las declaraciones oficiales de los gobiernos; las consecuencias de las alianzas internacionales, o la falta de ellas; los objetivos de las políticas y actividades establecidas en la agenda, incluyendo la Presidencia de México del G20 en 2012; y la participación global de los tres gobiernos en la cooperación multilateral desde la crisis financiera de 2008. Analizo las similitudes y diferencias entre ellos, demostrando las consecuencias estratégicas de las construcciones de identidad política en el G-20.

Unpacking the G20

“…The emergence of an Asian identity with the G20 has been touted and critiqued in equal measure (Dobson 2011a;Dobson 2012c). In the case of Latin America, Luckhurst (2015) explored the identity -endogenous and exogenous -of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico within the G20 from 2008 through to the mid 2010s. He argued that during this period Brazil and Mexico had become G20 insiders to a greater degree than Argentina as a result of their respective policy positions and levels of compliance with G20 commitments.…”

“…This appears to be the lone book treatment with a country-and G20-specific focus, although China has provided a focus for a number of journal articles and book chapters, occasionally on specific issues like development (Cooper and Farooq 2016;Gao and Wouters 2022). Contributions to leading journals and edited volumes have explored other rising, emerging or middle powers as a collective, or specifically in the case of India, Russia, Türkiye and Latin America, and occasionally on specific issues like development (Heine 2010;Cooper 2013a;Luckhurst 2015;Cooper and Farooq 2016;Downie 2017;Panova 2017;Parlar Dal and Kurşun 2018;Sachdeva 2022). European scholars have produced a welcome body of work focused on the EU's position and performance within the G20 (Debaere 2010; Debaere and Orbie 2012; Debaere 2014; Debaere, Lesage and Orbie 2014;Nasra and Debaere 2016).…”

Factions and agenda-setting in the G20 (2008-2019): Assessing Pre-Pandemic Dynamics

“…However, the G20 still has numerous weaknesses (Prodi, 2016), despite the progress in coherence and structure made over time since its emergence as a series of top-level informal meetings. One significant weakness is the present asymmetry in the representation of the interests of its component countries, reflected specifically in the under-representation of emerging economies (Benson & Zürn, 2019;Lei & Rui, 2016;Luckhurst, 2015;Prodi, 2016). This can be seen in how the proposals and solutions proposed at the end of each Annual Summit focus on the interests of high-profile countries to the detriment of the rest.…”