2017
DOI: 10.1111/dech.12294
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The Government Has Long Hands: Institutionalized Arbitrariness and Local Security Initiatives in Northern Uganda

Abstract: This article examines the relationship between the state security apparatus and local security initiatives in Gulu

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Cited by 18 publications
(31 citation statements)
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“…Jones (), writing about the neighbouring Teso sub‐region, saw the state as wilfully absent in rural Uganda. Tapscott () instead sees the Ugandan state (as observed in Acholiland) as a looming presence in citizens' perceptions, often absent in practice, but aware of what is going on and able to intervene when its interests are threatened; from what we were told, this resonates in Karamoja.…”
Section: Public Authority In Karamojamentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Jones (), writing about the neighbouring Teso sub‐region, saw the state as wilfully absent in rural Uganda. Tapscott () instead sees the Ugandan state (as observed in Acholiland) as a looming presence in citizens' perceptions, often absent in practice, but aware of what is going on and able to intervene when its interests are threatened; from what we were told, this resonates in Karamoja.…”
Section: Public Authority In Karamojamentioning
confidence: 94%
“…This effect resonates with most of the literature on plural policing, which has highlighted how private or community security actors do not so much erode state authority, as they reconfigure it through different forms of enrolment and complementarity (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009; Baker, 2002; Jones and Newburn, 2006). Tapscott (2017) even goes as far as to suggest for Uganda that the diffusion of security provision to local groups works as a deliberate strategy to consolidate central state power. Yet, in Chasana, the strong reliance on civilians, based on inherently informal means, outside the current legal framework, was also precarious to state control and did not simply involve complementarity.…”
Section: Everyday Policing In the Inner-city Peripherymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This activity is partly enabled by the Anti-Terrorist Act of 2002 that gave security agencies a lot of power. Museveni's hold on power owes much to the, at times, brutal violence meted out by the army and special forces under the command of his younger brother, and to networks of informants that are commonly believed to have infiltrated all institutions, from village councils and churches to universities (Tapscott 2017). It has been argued that international donors have (often indirectly) strengthened the Ugandan military, and, thus, supported the authoritarian and violent regime (Anderson & Fisher 2016, 68).…”
Section: Violence: Militarization Of the Politymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That makes for a constant flow ofand a constant suspicion ofinformation and questions that are considered a matter of or as scrutinizing "politics" and "security". (Verma 2013, 48) As noted by Rebecca Tapscott, who has recently conducted research on nonstate security provision in Acholi, there has been speculation as to the actual capacity of such local-level security initiatives and possible spy networks (Tapscott 2017). However, I would argue that from the perspective of Kitgum, and my informants, none of whom as far as I ever learned were themselves involved in such networks, the question of how efficient state security networks actually are, was somewhat irrelevant.…”
Section: Legacies Of State Violence In Northern Ugandamentioning
confidence: 99%