The global consequence of participatory responsibility

Abstract

The aim of this article is to introduce and defend a revised conception of responsibilitynamely, participatory responsibility. It starts from the insight that some pressing problems of global injustice render our common conception of responsibility useless. As an alternative the author mainly discusses Iris Marion Young's social connection model of responsibility. However, Young's approach becomes unconvincing in addressing and weighing specific duties. The author therefore adds a basic rights approach to her conception and argues that mere participation in a basic-rights-violating structure creates superordinated responsibilities for justice. Thus institutions and individual persons hold responsibility not because they have intentionally caused a foreseeable wrong, but because they have participated in, and thereby maintained, a social structure which has morally unacceptable effects.

Young’s Social Connection Model and Corporate Responsibility

“…Schrempf (2014) applies social connection responsibility specifically to obesity, extending Young's concept of responsibility by combining it with network theory to better examine how an actor is connected to a societal problem. Hahn (2009) bases his concept of 'participatory responsibility' on Young's SCMR. However, he is critical of the model in that "it fails to define a minimal basic-rights threshold and is trapped in the very same problem it originally meant to bypass -namely, the problem of the untraceability of causal chains" (Hahn 2009, p. 44).…”

“…However, he is critical of the model in that "it fails to define a minimal basic-rights threshold and is trapped in the very same problem it originally meant to bypass -namely, the problem of the untraceability of causal chains" (Hahn 2009, p. 44). Hahn (2009) provides one of the most detailed critiques of Young's SCMR and the challenges on assigning specific responsibilities. He addresses the challenges raised by introducing a model of participatory responsibility in which an actor's responsibility is related to her contribution to the structures that violate basic rights.…”

“…Since most of us bear more responsibility than we can reasonably be expected to discharge we must make choices about our contributions to resolve problems of structural injustices (Young 2006). When referring to power, privilege, interest, and collective ability as guiding principles for making one's choice (Young 2003a, 2003b, Young 2011, Young gives some advice how people ought to reason about their individual responsibilities (Hahn 2009) but does not elaborate a rationale for assigning responsibilities. (Aßländer, 2020, p. 723 ) The implication here is that it is the subjects' choice and decision howand to what degreeto meet their SCRs.…”

“…Business and human rights (BHR) performs a bridging role between LMR and SCMR (cf., Hahn 2009). BHR is the context and frame for the sources of autonomy, well-being, and selfesteem that some believe should be codified (LMR), but are not yet institutionally sanctionable (perhaps due to on-going disagreement about the severity or prominence of the injustice, jurisdiction, practicability, power, etc.).…”

“…SCMR has gained increasing attention amongst scholars in the business ethics literature (Wickert 2016;Schrempf 2012;Maak 2009;Scherer and Palazzo 2011). What is missing in these discussions, though, is a systematic internal critique of SCMR (for an exception see Hahn 2009) and its potential to inform business responsibilities. Generally, authors either render refutations en route to defending their own preferred position or are uncritically credulous about the parameters of a model similarly en route to defending their preferred position.…”