The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma

McCarter, Matthew W.; Budescu, David V.; Scheffran, Jürgen

doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.02.002

Cited by 31 publications

(42 citation statements)

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“…Consequently, in our setting, public goods provision is higher when starting with a pre-determined contribution level compared to a pure giving frame. While our experimental results cannot be generalized and inform directly on international climate negotiations, we provide the important insight that the mere existence of status-quo plays an important role for cooperation: The majority of individuals tend to abstain from exploiting or reversing existing public goods provision if they have the opporto taking (see McCarter et al 2011). In case participants differ with respect to wealth, it is shown that high endowed subjects are more likely to give to the public good, while low endowed subjects are more likely to take from the public good.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ratchet Up or Down? An Experimental Investigation of Global Public Good Provision in the United Nations Youth Associations Network

Gallier

Kesternich

LLschel³

et al. 2017

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Abstract: From a current perspective the Paris Agreement is not sufficient to limit the global mean temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial level as intended. The Agreement stipulates that parties review, compare and ratchet up efforts to combat climate change over time. Within this process, commitments heavily depend on what has been already achieved and this status-quo reflects an important reference point serving either as commitment advice or potential threat. We present an experimental study that is specifically designed to incorporate the effect of a status-quo via pre-existing contribution levels under endowment heterogeneity in a game in which participants make voluntary contributions to a public good. Our participants are sampled from the United Nations Youth Associations Network, representing participants from 51 countries. Members from developed and developing countries take decisions against the background of different initial levels of endowments and pre-existing contributions. Our analysis indicates that starting with ambitious pre-existing contribution levels can foster aggregate mitigation levels. Falling behind this status-quo contribution levels by reducing the public good appears to be a strong behavioral barrier. These observations might provide support for the basic structure of the Paris Agreement with Nationally Determined Contributions and the possibility to adjust them, even if a downward revision of national targets may not be precluded.Keywords: Paris Agreement; Nationally Determined Contributions; Ratched-up mechanism; International public goods; Online experiment JEL classification: H41; C91; F53; Q58 Acknowledgements: Special thanks to the United Nations Youth Associations Network (UN-YANET) and in particular Tjalke Weber and Anna-Katharina Deininger for their support in conducting this experiment. We also thank seminar and conferences audiences in Athens, Bremen, Kassel, Kiel, and Münster for constructive and very helpful comments. This project was made possible through funding from the Leibniz Association (funding code SAW-2014-ZMT-1 317).

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ratchet Up or Down? An Experimental Investigation of Global Public Good Provision in the United Nations Youth Associations Network

Gallier

Kesternich

LLschel³

et al. 2017

SSRN Journal

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“…In general, the resource is always available for everybody, which means that in every iteration the same set of actions can be performed by any player. This is the case in PD, PGP, Ultimatum, Dictator 2 , Centipede or Give-Or-Take-Some (GOTS) (McCarter et al, 2011), among others. In all these games, the resource is also divisible.…”

Section: Resourcementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dilemmas are present in many day-to-day situations (Fehr and Gintis, 2007;McCarter et al, 2011): Should people use public transport to favour traffic flow, or use private transportation for comfort? Should farmers over-exploit fields without any period of recovery for immediate profit, or should they give land a resting period for long term benefit?…”

Section: Cooperative Dilemmasmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Give and Take Game: Analysis of a Resource Sharing Game

Mariano

Correia

2015

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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We analyse Give and Take, a multi-stage resource sharing game to be played between two players. The payoff is dependent on the possession of an indivisible and durable resource, and in each stage players may either do nothing or, depending on their roles, give the resource or take it. Despite these simple rules, we show that this game has interesting complex dynamics. Unique to Give and Take is the existence of multiple Pareto optimal profiles that can also be Nash equilibria, and a built-in punishment action. This game allows us to study cooperation in sharing an indivisible and durable resource. Since there are multiple strategies to cooperate, Give and Take provides a base to investigate coordination under implicit or explicit agreements. We discuss its position in face of other games and real world situations that are better modelled by it. The paper presents an in-depth analysis of the game for the range of admissible parameter values. We show that, when taking is costly for both players, cooperation emerges as players prefer to give the resource.

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“…We also know that cooperation changes as a function of an individual role as a leader or a follower in social dilemmas (De Cremer, 2003). Indeed, recent scholarship reminds us that relative wealth is a cue that affects whether an individual deems it appropriate to be cooperative or not (McCarter, Budescu, & Scheffran, 2011). Using the logic of appropriateness, future scholarship may address the questions "How decision frames impact a person's choice of being a divided loyalist or a consistent cooperator?…”

Section: Implications and Future Research Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divided Loyalists or Conditional Cooperators? Creating Consensus About Cooperation in Multiple Simultaneous Social Dilemmas

2014

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The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma

Cited by 31 publications

References 50 publications

Ratchet Up or Down? An Experimental Investigation of Global Public Good Provision in the United Nations Youth Associations Network

Ratchet Up or Down? An Experimental Investigation of Global Public Good Provision in the United Nations Youth Associations Network

The Give and Take Game: Analysis of a Resource Sharing Game

Divided Loyalists or Conditional Cooperators? Creating Consensus About Cooperation in Multiple Simultaneous Social Dilemmas

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