2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2486693
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Divided Loyalists or Conditional Cooperators? Creating Consensus About Cooperation in Multiple Simultaneous Social Dilemmas

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Cited by 12 publications
(13 citation statements)
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References 51 publications
(33 reference statements)
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“…This nested structure is what differentiates the ML-PGG from other extensions of the standard PGG to multiple PGs (e.g. Cherry and Dickinson 2008, Falk et al 2013, McCarter et al 2014 2 and what allows the level problem to be captured by design.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This nested structure is what differentiates the ML-PGG from other extensions of the standard PGG to multiple PGs (e.g. Cherry and Dickinson 2008, Falk et al 2013, McCarter et al 2014 2 and what allows the level problem to be captured by design.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, it is revealed that one type of dilemma results in other dilemmas and more severe negative externalities, e.g., underuse of local POS and shirking/disuse of government's enforcement on POS management can cause residents, private sectors, and governments to engage in opportunistic overconsumption behaviour (Wilson and Kelling 1982), which adheres to the Prisoner's dilemma theory that individuals are more likely to behave opportunistically. This local phenomenon vitally addresses McCarter et al (2014) questions of what-and-how the multiple and simultaneous dilemmas take place and their effects on both ecological dimensions.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The total contribution of individuals is higher when a single public good is later split into two identical public goods. In McCarter et al (2014), subjects also face multiple public goods, but in one treatment they play two public good games with the same group of players, whereas in the other treatment, each game is played with a different group. In the latter, subjects shift their contributions towards the more cooperative group (see also Falk et al, 2013).…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%