The geopolitics behind the routes data travel: a case study of Iran

Abstract

In November 2019, in the wake of political demonstrations against the regime, Iran managed to selectively cut off most traffic from the global Internet while fully operating its own domestic network. It seemingly confirmed the main hypothesis our research had led us to, based on prior observation of data routing: Iran’s architecture of connectivity enables selective censorship of international traffic. This paper examines, through the case of Iran, how states can leverage the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) as a tool of geopolitical control and what are the trade-offs they face. This question raises a methodological question that we also address: how the analysis of BGP can infer and document these strategies of territorialization of cyberspace. The Internet is a network of networks where each network is an autonomous system. Autonomous systems (ASes) are independent administrative entities controlled by a variety of actors such as governments, companies and universities. Their administrators have to agree and communicate on the path followed by packets travelling across the Internet, which is made possible by BGP. Agreements between ASes are often confidential but BGP requires neighbouring ASes to interact with each other in order to coordinate routing through the constant release of connectivity update messages. These messages announce the availability (or withdrawal) of a sequence of ASes that can be followed to reach an IP address prefix. In our study, we inferred the structure of Iran's connectivity through the capture and analysis of these BGP announcements. We show how the particularities of Iran's BGP and connectivity structure can enable active measures, such as censorship, both internally and externally throughout the network. We argue that Iran has found a way to reconcile a priori conflicting strategic goals: developing a self-sustaining and resilient domestic Internet, but with tight control at its borders. It thus enables the regime to leverage connectivity as a tool of censorship in the face of social instability and as a tool of regional influence in the context of strategic competition.

Regional Transformation via Rail: A Historical and Analytical Examination of Iran's Railway Network and its Socio-Economic Impacts

“…Although railways often serve as the bedrock for large-scale transport, road networks act as essential conduits, aiding in the movement on a more granular level [34]. Furthermore, in a geopolitical context, these transport avenues, when combined, can potentially foster soft diplomacy by enhancing interpersonal relations, nurturing cultural interchanges, and fortifying economic ties, a concept termed "people-to-people diplomacy" [35]. Hence, the geopolitical significance of Iran's border provinces necessitates a holistic development of both transport modalities, aligning with trade, defence, and diplomatic objectives [36].…”

Cyber Peace

“…This was in fact the case with Iran which, as noted earlier, had a single point of control until 2011. However, in recognition of the potential vulnerabilities to foreign intrusions that this created, Iran has since sought to add complexity to its digital infrastructure (Salamatian et al, 2019). But, as a result, it also had to acquire greater expertise to manage this complexity, developing a broader range of tools to monitor users and control access (Kottasová and Mazloumsaki, 2019).…”

Macht im Cyberspace: Eine Übersicht der bisherigen Forschung und künftiger Perspektiven anhand des Proxy-Konzepts

“…B. MacDonald 2020). Für die Zukunft ebenfalls zunehmend bedeutend könnte zudem die Instrumentalisierung bestimmter Bestandteile der globalen Internetinfrastruktur, wie dem Border Gateway Protocol, seitens autokratischer Regime wie dem Iran sein (vgl Salamatian et al 2021…”