The Gap Between Lifetime Fertility Intentions and Completed Fertility in Europe and the United States: A Cohort Approach

Abstract

We study the aggregate gap between intended and actual fertility in 19 European countries and the US based on a cohort approach. This complements prior research that had mainly used a period approach. We compare the mean intended number of children among young women aged 20 to 24 (born in the early 1970s), measured during the 1990s in the Fertility and Family Surveys, with data on completed fertility in the same cohorts around age 40. In a similar manner, we compare the share who state that they do not want a child with actual cohort childlessness. Our exploration is informed by the cognitive-social model of fertility intentions developed by Bachrach and Morgan (Popul Dev Rev 39(3):459-485, 2013). In all countries, women eventually had, on average, fewer children than the earlier expectations in their birth cohort, and more often than intended, they remained childless. The results reveal distinct regional patterns, which are most apparent for childlessness. The gap between intended and actual childlessness is widest in the Southern European and the German-speaking countries and smallest in the Central and Eastern European countries. Additionally, we analyze the aggregate intentions-fertility gap among women with different levels of education. The gap is largest among highly educated women in most countries studied and the educational gradient varies by region, most distinctively for childlessness. Differences between countries suggest that contextual factors-norms about parenthood, work-family policies, unemployment-shape women's fertility goals, total family size, and the gap between them.

Education and fertility in the context of rising inequality

“…Thus, the gap between desired and actual fertility varies substantially across Europe (Bongaarts 2001;Goldstein et al 2003). Consistent with previous work (Bongaarts, 2001;Quesnel-Valleé and Morgan 2003), both Testa (2012) and Beaujouan and Berghammer (2017) find that, across educational groups, the shortfall in births is larger on average among highly-educated women in Europe.…”

“…Fertility was lowest among the mosteducated women, many of whom chose to devote more resources to each child rather than more time to childbearing, and thus reduced their family size. However, because fertility intentions among the most-educated remained relatively high, the gap between their intended and actual fertility became relatively wide in most countries (Testa 2014;Beaujouan and Berghammer 2017). Interestingly, new evidence, particularly since the recent Great Recession, suggests that there has been a gradual convergence in fertility rates among educational groups and a flattening of the existing negative educational-fertility gradient in some countries, such as the United States (Pew Research 2013 for the U.S.).…”

Bayesian Probabilistic Population Projections for France

“…The convergence hypothesis follows the literature showing that, in high-income societies, differentials become smaller in absolute and relative terms. Jalovaara et al (2018) found that among the highly educated societies of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, there are almost to no differentials in the ultimate fertility of women between education categories 10 (see also Beaujouan & Berghammer, 2019).…”

Uncertain population futures: Critical reflections on the IHME Scenarios of future fertility, mortality, migration and population trends from 2017 to 2100

“…Many couples postpone first birth to ever later ages, which in turn depresses period fertility rates (Bongaarts 2002). Low-fertility countries also display a persistent gap between desired family size, which is often at or around two children, and considerably lower levels of actual fertility (Beaujouan and Berghammer 2019), indicating that many women and couples are not able to realise their fertility aspirations.…”

“…For instance, the SDG pace scenario for Japan envisions a TFR of 1.20 in 2100, with a CI_95 ranging from 0.95 to 1.85. decades as compared with the other scenarios ( Figure 6 above). Considering unrealised desire for more children among many couples (Beaujouan and Berghammer 2019) and the trend to higher gender equality and more generous family policies, a more deeply thought-through scenarios broadly compatible with SDGs could instead imply a modest fertility recovery due to higher levels of gender equality and more extensive government support for families.…”