The Framework of Essences in Spinoza's<i>Ethics</i>

Martin, Christopher

doi:10.1080/09608780802200489

Cited by 32 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…Intuitive self-knowledge becomes entirely singular then, insofar as it pertains to the unique essence of the particular modal expression in which we participate (Soyarslan, 2016). And yet, this singular essence is also shared and transindividual, in the spirit of a new seventeenth century naturalism or empiricism (Martin, 2008;Negri, 1991).…”

Section: Key Themesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking with Spinoza about education

Freitas

Sellar

Jensen

2017

Educational Philosophy and Theory

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Section: Key Themesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking with Spinoza about education

Freitas

Sellar

Jensen

2017

Educational Philosophy and Theory

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“…190–1; (Bennett, ), §16.2; (Koistinen, ), pp. 13–4; (Della Rocca, ), p. 133; (Yovel, ), p. 163; (Martin, ), p. 492; cf. (Garrett, ), p. 152n5.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…But the scholium doesn't require this reading; its point is rather that we can conceive of the essences of nonexistent things on the basis of ideas of other things. A third argument appeals to Spinoza's doctrine of mind eternity. The claim is that if minds outside duration no longer retain distinguishing personal markers of memory and imagination, such minds are reduced to ‘the essence of the[ir] kind’ ((Martin, ), p. 493). But this doesn't follow: outside duration particular minds can be distinguished qua unique sets of adequate ideas.…”

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confidence: 99%

Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason

Hübner

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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The article proposes a new solution to the long-standing problem of the universality of essences in Spinoza's ontology. It argues that, according to Spinoza, particular things in nature possess unique essences, but that these essences coexist with more general, mind-dependent species-essences, constructed by finite minds on the basis of similarities ('agreements') that obtain among the properties of formally-real particulars. This account provides the best fit both with the textual evidence and with Spinoza's other metaphysical and epistemological commitments. The article offers new readings of how Spinoza understands not just the nature of essence, but also the nature of being, reason, striving, definitions, and different kinds of knowledge.

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“…Commentators who read EIID2 in this way include Bennett : 61, Yovel : 163, Della Rocca : 95; 2000: 133, and Martin : 491.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In EI there is another passage—EIP8S2—which provides less direct textual support for the interpretation that Spinoza uses the term ‘essence’ to refer to a common nature. For an excellent treatment of this passage, see Martin : 493–4.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Distinction between Reason and Intuitive Knowledge inSpinoza'sEthics

Soyarslan

2013

European J of Philosophy

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While both intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva) and reason (ratio) are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. Intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza describes as the ‘greatest virtue of mind’, is superior to reason. The nature of this superiority has been the subject of some controversy due to Spinoza's notoriously parsimonious treatment of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in the Ethics. In this paper, I argue that intuitive knowledge differs from reason not only in terms of its method of cognition—but also in terms of its content. More specifically, I maintain that there is something that is known by intuition, namely the unique essences of things, that is not known by reason. My argument is supported by an examination of Spinoza's account of essences in the Ethics, which reveals that he is committed to both unique and shared essences. Based on this dual commitment, I argue that whereas for Spinoza both reason and intuition can be said to reach adequate knowledge of the shared essence of a thing, the unique essence of a singular thing, which is nothing but its actual essence, can only be known through intuitive knowledge.

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The Framework of Essences in Spinoza'sEthics

Cited by 32 publications

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Thinking with Spinoza about education

Thinking with Spinoza about education

Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason

The Distinction between Reason and Intuitive Knowledge inSpinoza'sEthics

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