The Fourth Meditation

Abstract

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Das Ende vom Problem des methodischen Anfangs: Descartes’ antiskeptisches Argument

“…Diese Deutung vermag nicht zu überzeugen, denn das Konzept der scheinbaren Kohärenz ist weder in den Meditationen nachweisbar noch plausiblerweise als Konzept vorstellbar: Da die Kohärenz der Erfahrungen als Kriterium für die Wahrheit eines Erfahrungsinhalts dienen soll, muss sie dem epistemischen Subjekt direkt zugänglich sein, also kann Kohärenz nicht nur scheinbar auftreten. 5 Frederick F. Schmitt (1986) und Lex Newman (1999) (1) Denn freilich, weil ich weiß, dass alle Empfindungen mir über das, was dem Körper nützlich ist, weit häufiger das Wahre als das Falsche anzeigen, da ich mich ferner fast stets mehrerer Sinne bedienen kann, um eine und dieselbe Sache zu prüfen, und über dies des Gedächtnisses, das das Gegenwärtige mit dem Vergangenen verknüpft, und des Verstandes, der bereits alle Gründe des Irrtums durchschaut, so brauche ich nicht weiter zu fürchten, dass das mir von den Sinnen täglich Dargebotene falsch sei, sondern darf alle übertriebenen Zweifel dieser Tage als lächerlich verwerfen,…”

“…Gt → 11 "Continuity test" nennt dies Newman (1999) und "Konnexionsprinzip" Perler (1998. Uns scheint (wie Hanna, 1992) die Bezeichnung "Kohärenz" genau treffend -Descartes ist eben nicht nur der erkenntnistheoretische "Fundamentalist", als der er allenthalben vorgestellt wird.…”

Taking the Fourth: Steps toward a New (Old) Reading of Descartes

“…3 3 Most commentators fail to acknowledge the importance of Meditation IV in overcoming the doubt about clear and distinct ideas, but Newman, “The Fourth Meditation,” is a notable exception. …”

“…5 5 AT VII, 144; CSM II, 102–3; Newman, “The Fourth Meditation,” and Loeb, “The Priority of Reason in Descartes,” stress this way of putting Descartes's point. …”

Sensory Doubts and the Directness of Perception in the Meditations1

“…13 13 For reasons I detail elsewhere (Newman 1999, 2010), this is a nonoptional step in the argument—independent of the DTP/ITP debate. The passage says that “God has given me no faculty at all for recognizing any such source for these ideas; on the contrary, he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced by corporeal things.” And note that in the very next paragraph of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes adds that from “the very fact that God is not a deceiver” there is a “consequent impossibility of there being any falsity in my opinions which cannot be corrected by some other faculty supplied by God” (CSM 2:55f, AT 7:80). …”