Taking the Fourth: Steps toward a New (Old) Reading of Descartes

Rocca, Michael Della

doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2011.00222.x

Cited by 4 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…So, too, after finally offering an argument later in Meditation III for the claim that God is not a deceiver, Descartes immediately goes on in Meditation IV to raise a doubt about this claim. (2006, 142–3, 2011, 94)Descartes raises this worry about God’s non-deceptiveness in the following passage:[S]ince God does not wish to deceive me, he surely did not give me the kind of faculty which would ever enable me to go wrong while using it correctly. There would be no further doubt [ dubium ] on this issue were it not that what I have just said appears to imply that I am incapable of ever going wrong.…”

Section: The Problem Of Meditation IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Descartes will not have removed this doubt and beaten back the skeptic about clear and distinct ideas until he has shown how it is compatible with God’s nondeceptiveness that we sometimes err. (2006, 143, 2011, 94)To resolve this problem, Descartes must ‘answer the following question: How, if God is not a deceiver and thus does not allow clear and distinct ideas to be false, can God allow that I ever make mistakes, in particular with regard to ideas that are not clear and distinct?’ (2006, 143, 2011, 94). In other words, Descartes needs to show that while God’s veracity (‘God is not a deceiver’) entails the truth rule (‘clear and distinct ideas are true’), it does not entail human infallibility 3…”

Section: The Problem Of Meditation IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problem Of Meditation IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problem Of Meditation IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In two recent papers, Michael Della Rocca locates a distinct instance of circular reasoning in Descartes’ Fourth Meditation – i.e. distinct from the traditional ‘Cartesian Circle’ of the Third Meditation (2011, 2006). 1 This new circle, Della Rocca alleges, is an even more intractable fallacy: it is a bona fide instance of premise circularity in which the ‘truth rule’ (‘everything I clearly and distinctly perceive is true’) functions as a sub-premise in its own proof.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Against the new Cartesian Circle

Fulmer

Ragland

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Section: The Problem Of Meditation IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problem Of Meditation IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problem Of Meditation IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problem Of Meditation IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Against the new Cartesian Circle

Fulmer

Ragland

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Faculties, Knowledge, and Reasons for Doubt in the Cartesian Circle

Clark

2019

Mind

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This paper argues for a novel solution to the Cartesian Circle by emphasising the important epistemic role of the Second Meditation and Descartes’ faculty epistemology. I argue that, for Descartes: doubt requires a ‘good reason’ to doubt (§2.1); whether a reason qualifies as a ‘good reason’ depends on which faculty produces that reason (§2.2); and for distinct metaphysical perceptions from the faculty of the intellect, no other faculty can provide ‘good reasons’ to doubt (§2.3). The upshot of §2 is that the doubts raised up to the Third Meditation do not apply to the distinct metaphysical perceptions of the intellect, and in particular do not apply to the premises of the proof of the existence of God. I present the role of God as primarily to secure clear and distinct perceptions beyond the intellect, and knowledge of conclusions when those conclusions are no longer being clearly and distinctly perceived (§3.1). Finally, I give an account of Descartes’ use of ‘cognoscere’, ‘scire’, and ‘scientia’ as three distinct epistemic levels, providing a valuable structure within which one can see the meditator progress (§3.2).

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Perfection in the Balance of Descartes’s Epistemological Project

Thompson¹

2019

History of Philosophy Quarterly

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This article redresses the function of the theodicy in Descartes’s epistemological project. In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes establishes the meditator’s knowledge as attainable through the proper use of the freedom of the will in the act of judgment. This freedom implies a will that is at once perfect in its likeness to God’s own will and only perfectible in its propensity to err in its judgments. The theodicy is thus necessary to sustain the balance between the (unlimited) perfection of God and the (limited) perfection of the meditator.

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Taking the Fourth: Steps toward a New (Old) Reading of Descartes

Cited by 4 publications

References 13 publications

Against the new Cartesian Circle

Against the new Cartesian Circle

Faculties, Knowledge, and Reasons for Doubt in the Cartesian Circle

Perfection in the Balance of Descartes’s Epistemological Project

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