The Folk Psychology of Consciousness*

Arico, Adam; Fiala, Brian; Goldberg, Robert F.; Nichols, Shaun

doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199927418.003.0006

Cited by 21 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(21 reference statements)

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“…Other work on adult judgments of mental states suggests that adults have a tendency to attribute mental states (e.g., feeling pain, being happy) to plants (Arico et al 2011).…”

Section: Benighted Teleologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Persistence through function preservation

Rosé

2014

Synthese

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How do ordinary material objects persist? For instance, if a rock is hit with a hammer and chipped, does the rock survive? Or if a rock is smashed to pieces by a hammer, does the rock survive the smashing? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of persistence that fits with folk intuitions and have charged leading views with failing to do so. Yet, there is disagreement about what the folk intuit and no empirical discipline to the discussion. For a debate so heavily centered on folk intuitions, it seems that some empirical evidence might help advance the discussion. Indeed, it seems that empirically discerning the folk view of persistence will help decide whether it deserves to be taken seriously. So my question is:what is the folk view of persistence against which metaphysical accounts might be measured? My view is that the folk view of persistence is teleological in that the folk tend to intuit that a material object survives alterations when its function is preserved. As such, I hold that the folk view of persistence is tied into a benighted view of nature and thus deserves to be dismissed. Given an empirically informed understanding of the folk view of persistence, I hold that the discussion over how ordinary objects persist should be liberated from any demanded conformity with folk intuitions.The Plan: I'll begin, in Section I, by briefly documenting some conflicting claims about the folk view of persistence and charges of failing to fit common sense. In Section II, I will present evidence from psychology which suggests that the folk are promiscuous teleologists. Given the background of promiscuous teleology, I will then go on, in Section III, to present a range of evidence in support of the claim that the folk view of persistence is teleological. Having achieved sufficient empirical understanding of the folk view of persistence to judge its credentials, I will, in Section IV, argue for a dismissive take on folk intuitions about material object persistence. I will situate the discussion within the background of what Dan Korman (2009) calls the challenge from folk belief and discuss my results in the context of debunking arguments in order to show how the challenge can be met, concluding that in the specific case of persistence, the folk do not deserve to be taken seriously. They deserve to be ignored. I. Persistence and Common SenseHow do ordinary material objects persist? There are two general answers. The first is the answer of the four dimensionalist. According to the four dimensionalist, ordinary material objects persist by having temporal parts, in addition to spatial parts, which are spread out across regions of spacetime. Ordinary objects persist by having distinct temporal parts at more than one time: they persist by perduring. The second answer, that of the three dimensionalist, denies that ordinary material objects persist by having temporal parts. Instead, the three dimensionalist holds that ordinary material objects persist by being "wholly present" at more than one time,

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“…Other work on adult judgments of mental states suggests that adults have a tendency to attribute mental states (e.g., feeling pain, being happy) to plants (Arico et al 2011).…”

Section: Benighted Teleologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Persistence through function preservation

Rosé

2014

Synthese

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“…It is also related to synthetic epistemology, which is defined as the creation and analysis of artificial systems in order to clarify philosophical issues that arise in the explanation of how agents, both natural and artificial, represent the world (Chrisley and Holland, 1994[43]). One of history's phenomenological projects was the description of human consciousness; the synthetic phenomenological project is the description of machine consciousness – a way in which people working on machine consciousness can measure the extent to which they have succeeded in realising consciousness in a machine (Husserl, 1960[126]; 1964[127]; Damasio, 2012[61]; Arico et al ., 2011[11]).…”

Section: Consciousness and Artificial Intelligencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The approximation inherent in higher-level descriptions means that the wholesale exclusion of approaches like folk psychology is not necessarily appropriate, because such approximate descriptions might sometimes be, in some ways, analogous with the higher levels of description in the physical sciences (Arico et al ., 2012[11]).The issue with computational/mathematical modelling without reference to lower-level (e.g. physiological) structures at all, is that such modelling is analogous to trying to directly implement the user manual for a complex computational system.…”

Section: Contributions Of Philosophy To Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Contributions Of Philosophy To Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: Part 2 (An anthology of various other models)

Sousa¹

2013

Mens Sana Monogr

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The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and empathy, which will help us understand consciousness better. There have been inroads made from the fields of computer science, machine technology and artificial intelligence, including robotics, into understanding the consciousness of these machines and their implications for human consciousness. These areas are explored. Visual cortex and emotional theories along with their implications are discussed. The phylogeny and evolution of the phenomenon of consciousness is also highlighted, with theories on the emergence of consciousness in fetal and neonatal life. Quantum physics and its insights into the mind, along with the implications of consciousness and physics and their interface are debated. The role of neurophilosophy to understand human consciousness, the functions of such a concept, embodiment, the dark side of consciousness, future research needs and limitations of a scientific theory of consciousness complete the review. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with certain pitfalls, if present. A need for the integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed.

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“…Social psychology has investigated theory of mind (mentalizing) for decades, and the most promising work in experimental philosophy of mind draws heavily from this literature rather than trying to reinvent the wheel (e.g., Arico et al. ; Robbins and Jack ). Similarly, psychologists studying theory of mind benefit from collaborating with philosophers…”

Section: The Experimentalist Project and Its Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Philosophy

Higgins

Dyschkant

2014

Metaphilosophy

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Many philosophers would, in theory, agree that the methods and tools of philosophy ought to be supplemented by those of other academic disciplines. In practice, however, the sociological data suggest that most philosophers fail to engage or collaborate with other academics, and this article argues that this is problematic for philosophy as a discipline. In relation to the value of interdisciplinary collaboration, the article highlights how experimental philosophers can benefit the field, but only insofar as they draw from the distinctive methods of philosophy and overcome the charge of “amateur psychology” by more consistently collaborating with the scientists they seek to emulate. It concludes that philosophers ought to collaborate with other academics in order to gain an experience‐based understanding of the methods of other disciplines in addition to an understanding of the content of these disciplines.

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The Folk Psychology of Consciousness*

Cited by 21 publications

References 17 publications

Persistence through function preservation

Persistence through function preservation

Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: Part 2 (An anthology of various other models)

Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Philosophy

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