The ‘Floating’Ummahin the Fall of ‘Ahok’ in Indonesia

Abstract

The article examines the idea of a ‘floating’ ummah in Indonesia today that affects the workings of Indonesian Islamic politics and democracy itself. It is asserted that the ummah, or community of believers, are more disconnected from the large mainstream Islamic organisational vehicles in Indonesia than is often claimed. A considerable cross-section of this community has become increasingly disaffected with the status quo, as social inequalities sharpen and educated youths who face uncertain futures find appeal in the tough rhetoric of fringe Islamic organisations. This rhetoric emphasises absolute standards of morality as a solution to social and economic predicaments, thereby resulting in the mainstreaming of rigid religious attitudes. Consequently, organisations seen as guardians of ‘religious moderation’ have also picked up on them in an attempt to remain relevant to their increasingly socially heterogeneous constituencies. The overall result is an Islamic politics that has become more intolerant, especially when identity politics gets absorbed into conflicts between different oligarchic factions. This was seen in the dramatic fall of the ethnic-Chinese and Christian former governor of Jakarta known as ‘Ahok’ in 2017.

Power relation of the 212 Islamic Group and the government in the 2019 presidential election

“…This research is interesting because it looked at the cause of the strengthening of the Islamism movement by the 212 Islamic Group. This research is different from previous research, such as those conducted by Hadiz (2018) and Mietzner (2018). It can be an input for the government to respond and take reasonable action against the existence of the Islamism movement.…”

“…However, in this research, this action was considered as an Islamic movement. While Hadiz (2018) stated that the cause of the presence of ABI 3 was the existence of an oligarchic system and Mietzner (2018) stated that an open and democratic political system allowed ABI 3 to emerge, this research saw the causal factor of this action was the discourse on the government led by Jokowi as secular. Along with this factor, another factor that had driven this action to rise since 2016 till today and could be accepted widely in Indonesia was because of the ideological nation of public space, the creation of political momentum, and a change in the group's approach from a street group to institutionally oriented one.…”

“…The goal of ABI 3 was to get Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, hereafter called Ahok, the Governor of Jakarta, to be jailed (Miichi 2019). The action spearheaded by the MUI Fatwa Guard National Movement (GNPF MUI) -a name used by 212 Islamic Group -not only made Ahok be jailed but also made him who was incumbent in the 2017 Jakarta Governor Election, failing to maintain his position as the number one in the capital city (Hadiz 2018).…”

“…There are two points of view about ABI3 conducted by the 212 Islamic Group. Fealy (2016) stated that the action was not an Islamic movement, while Hadiz (2018) and Mietzner (2018) stated otherwise. However, in this research, this action was considered as an Islamic movement.…”

Kebangkitan Konservatisme Islam: Politik Identitas dan Potret Demokrasi di Indonesia

“…Buku ini berusaha untuk memberikan kontribusi dalam bentuk model analisis yang berbeda dengan kebanyakan buku lain yang cenderung menganggap bahwa konservatisme Islam hanyalah alat yang digunakan dalam perjuangan kekuasaan oligarkis semata, tanpa kekuatan atau agensi untuk membentuk jalan mereka sendiri (misalnya, Hadiz (2016)). Buku ini justru memperlihatkan motivasimotivasi ideologis para aktivis Islamis berikut organisasi-organisasinya dan agensi mereka dalam proses tawar-menawar dan negosiasi dengan aktor-aktor politik nasional dan daerah untuk memastikan agenda Islamis mereka, seperti penerapan peraturan-peraturan daerah bernuansa syariah, berjalan dengan lancar (hlm.…”