The Federal Administrative Agencies

Landis, James M.; Friendly, Henry J.

doi:10.2307/1598581

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Writing during the New Deal, Landis (1938) saw regulation as a political response to the failure of courts to keep up with the community ideas of justice. He thought that the advocacy of "leaving the problems of railroad charges and management to work themselves out in the courts as questions arise from time to time…indicates a singular unawareness of the fact that the chief drive for the resort to the administrative process in the field of railroad regulation arose from a recognition that the remedies that the courts could provide were insufficient to make effective the policies that were being demanded."…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise of the Regulatory State

Glaeser¹,

Shleifer²

2003

Journal of Economic Literature

202

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During the Progressive Era at the beginning of the 20 th century, the United States replaced litigation by regulation as the principal mechanism of social control of business. To explain why this happened, we present a model of choice of law enforcement strategy between litigation and regulation based on the idea that justice can be subverted with sufficient expenditure of resources. The model suggests that courts are more vulnerable to subversion than regulators, especially in an environment of significant inequality of wealth and political power. The switch to regulation can then be seen as an efficient response to the subversion of justice by robber barons during the Gilded Age. The model makes sense of the progressive reform agenda, and of the successes and failures of alternative law enforcement strategies in different countries.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise of the Regulatory State

Glaeser¹,

Shleifer²

2003

Journal of Economic Literature

202

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“…92. See only (Holmes 1897), and (Landis 1938 the world sought to address regulatory challenges arising from cross-border developments, the hitherto pursued public programs of social policy came to be seen as resting on increasingly shaky ground. As globalization began to unfold within the fragile architecture of domestic legal and political systems, the challenges to both the regulatory concepts and instruments of the social engineers and the political hopes in the self- The challenges of globalization to domestic state-originating welfare programs-that had in their growth during the twentieth century involved dramatic increases in redistribution, juridification and infrastructure provision-had a very domestic face.…”

Section: Aspirations Of Functionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…165. (Landis 1938); (Willis 1935). traditional mode where "true" legal expertise is required, for example in the protection of property interests through the formal application of allegedly "clear" legal norms.…”

Section: "One Can Reject the Imperialist Claims Of The Criterion Of Ementioning

confidence: 99%

“…181. (Landis 1938 (Luhmann 1988a); (Teubner 2006); (Zumbansen 2006a It is against this background that we may gain a deeper, contextualized, understanding of the present dominance of functionalism in many fields of law and policy on both sides of the Atlantic. Certainly after 1989, there has been an ever more widely held view that we are witnessing a global convergence of modes of thinking about economic regulation and state governance.…”

Section: Conceptual Pathsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law

Zumbansen

2008

am j comp law

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This paper analyzes the contemporary emergence of neo-formalist and neo-functionalist approaches to law-making at a time when the state is seeking to reassert, reformulate and reconceptualize its regulatory competence, both domestically and transnationally.While the earlier turn to alternative regulation modes, conceptualized under the heading of "legal pluralism," "responsive law," or "reflexive law" in the 1970s and 1980s, had aimed at a more socially responsive, contextualized, and ultimately learning mode of legal intervention, the contemporary revival of functionalist jurisprudence and its reliance on "social norms" embraces a limitation model of legal regulation. After revisiting the Legal Realist critique of Formalism and the formulation of functionalist regulation as a progressive agenda, this paper reflects on both the American and German justifications of market regulation and the Welfare State in order to trace the different evolution towards 'responsive law' and legal pluralism in the U.S. and 'post-interventionist' and 'reflexive' law in Germany. This comparison allows for an identification of the emerging transnational qualities of legal normativity in the face of a declining welfare state paradigm, which -at the beginning of the 21st century -appears to provide the stage for turning the progressive gains of the former era into a set of market-oriented justifications of private autonomy and de-regulation.Sfb 597 "Staatlichkeit im Wandel" -"Transformations of the State" (WP 82)

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“…The model, premised upon control over administrative processes to limit discretion, resonated with practitioners as a source of professional legitimacy. Administrators limited by procedures and the application of objective expertise could serve as conduits between the political world and the public, exercising expertise on behalf of the public interest (Landis, 1938;Freidrich, 1940). At the same time, limiting the discretion of public managers through ex ante controls has traditionally been understood as a way to decrease corruption and the dominance of parochial interests (Anechario & Jacobs, 1996) and to ensure predictable service to the demands of constituent groups (Knott & Miller, 1987).…”

Section: Managing For Process: Separating Politics From Administrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing for inclusion: balancing control and participation

Feldman

Khademian

2000

International Public Management Journal

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Participation and control are both necessary in a democracy. In the two main models of public management, control trumps participation. The traditional model, Managing for Process, relies on centralized authority over process and emphasizes rules and regulations. The newer model, Managing for Results, permits decentralized control over process but relies on centralized control of results. We propose a third model, Managing for Inclusion, which has the potential to balance participation and control. Our model permits decentralized control over both process and results and requires centralized control over the implementation of participation. The tools of empowerment, teamwork, and continuous improvement take on new meanings in this model. We show how management tools such as training and rewarding can implement participation and control the process of inclusion.

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The Federal Administrative Agencies

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

The Rise of the Regulatory State

The Rise of the Regulatory State

Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law

Managing for inclusion: balancing control and participation

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