The Externalities Associated with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater

Provencher, Bill; Burt, Oscar R.

doi:10.1006/jeem.1993.1010

Cited by 208 publications

(141 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

135

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Substituting for φ t+2 from the capital co-state equation (15) and then substituting for φ t+1 from the investment first-order condition (13) evaluated at period t yields (1 + r h )u (c t ) = (1 + r m )u (c t+1 ). Substituting this into (19) and dividing by u (c t+1 ) leaves the (interior) efficiency condition (7).…”

Section: Utility Maximization and Sustainabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainability economics of groundwater usage and management

Knapp¹,

Franklin²

2015

Handbook of Water Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Utility Maximization and Sustainabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainability economics of groundwater usage and management

Knapp¹,

Franklin²

2015

Handbook of Water Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Tsur [1990] discusses the stabilization role of groundwater and implications for the resource development when surface water supplies are uncertain. Provencher and Burt [1993] consider the externalities associated with the common property exploitation of groundwater with the stochastic surface water supply.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal extraction from a renewable groundwater aquifer with stochastic recharge

Zeitouni

2004

Water Resources Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

[1] This work considers the management of an aquifer with stochastic recharge and finite boundaries. For a class of such models we show that there is a positive threshold of the water stock that the manager should aim at keeping. Thus, under the optimal extraction regime at a time when the water stock is lower than this threshold, there should be no pumping from the aquifer, while at times when the water stock is greater than the threshold, all water in excess of the threshold level should be pumped. The threshold level happens to coincide with the aquifer boundary for sufficiently high unit cost of pumping, in which case, only the runoff water of excess recharge should be collected.

show abstract

“…The case of groundwater management in particular has been dealt with in Xepapadeas (1996), which considers a quantity-quality problem where contamination depends only on the amount of water pumped, in Provencher and Burt (1993), which analyses the impact of strategical behavior on the e¢ciency of the common property solution, and in Rubio and Casino (2001), which contains a quantity-only management model and investigates nonlinear feedback strategies. All of these papers consider symmetrical water users and most establish myopic and optimal solutions as extremes, with feedback solutions somewhere in between.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Games in Groundwater Management

Roseta-Palma¹,

Brasão²

2004

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Previous work has shown that quality-quantity interactions may alter the typical results of private management under the assumption of myopic behavior. The main objective of the paper is to analyse the role of feedback strategies in a model containing an integrated quantity-quality approach, analyzing the impact on water use, pollution and shadow resource prices.The case of symmetric players is shown to yield results that are similar to those of models in previous literature, in that it establishes myopic and optimal solutions as extremes, with feedback solutions somewhere in between. However, as di¤erent water users do not have similar objectives or constraints, it is important to consider the case of asymmetric players. This paper shows that when agents are asymmetric, especially as regards external e¤ects, strategic solutions can be more extreme than the myopic ones.

show abstract

The Externalities Associated with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater

Cited by 208 publications

References 0 publications

Sustainability economics of groundwater usage and management

Sustainability economics of groundwater usage and management

Optimal extraction from a renewable groundwater aquifer with stochastic recharge

Strategic Games in Groundwater Management

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About