The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value

Goldman, Alan H.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-594x.2006.00211.x

Cited by 37 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Considering the motivations for pessimism is complicated by the fact that pessimism is more often assumed than argued for. For example, Matravers (2005: 198–200) and Schellekens (2007: 117) both assume the truth of pessimism as part of a wider argument without offering much by way of support for pessimism itself, while Hopkins (2000) and Goldman (2006: 333) treat pessimism as a datum to be explained rather than a thesis to be argued for. It is important to add that this need not be seen as a criticism.…”

Section: The Case For Pessimismmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Aesthetic Testimony

Robson

2012

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is frequently claimed that we can learn very little, if anything, about the aesthetic character of an artwork (or other object of aesthetic appraisal) on the basis of testimony. Such disparaging assessments of the epistemic value of aesthetic testimony contrast markedly with our acceptance of testimony as an important (perhaps even basic) source of knowledge in many other areas. There have, however, been a number of challenges to this orthodoxy of late; from those who seek to deny that such a contrast exists (optimists) as well as attempts by those who accept the distinction (pessimists) to provide an explanation and defence of the contrast. In , I outline a little of the nature and history of the debate over aesthetic testimony. , focuses on the opposing positions on aesthetic testimony, optimism and pessimism, and takes steps to clarify what exactly is at issue between them. In , I survey considerations which have been adduced in favour of pessimism ranging from brute appeal to intuition to complex argumentation before turning in , to look at motivations for optimism. Finally, in , I consider some alternative views which claim that, for a variety of reasons, it is a mistake to construe the debate over aesthetic testimony as concerned (or at least as primarily concerned) with the epistemic standing of aesthetic beliefs formed on the basis of testimony.

show abstract

Section: The Case For Pessimismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 7 As is not uncommon in the literature see e.g. Wollheim (1980: 233), Meskin (2004: 65) and Goldman (2006: 33). …”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Aesthetic Testimony

Robson

2012

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…32 Though my own personal sympathies lie with something like the virtue-theoretic account offered in, e.g., Goldie (2007). 33 The opening paragraph of Goldman (2006), e.g., appears to contain an example of this error. 34 Gorodeisky (2010) tentatively suggests some alternative norms based on considerations from Kant's account of aesthetic judgement.…”

Section: Jon Robsonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Likely examples of unavailability pessimists include Alan Goldman (), Richard Wollheim (), Philip Pettit () and Roger Scruton () as well as Hopkins' former self (Hopkins ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation

Robson

2013

Eur J Philos

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Unusability pessimism has recently emerged as an appealing new option for pessimists about aesthetic testimony—those who deny the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony. Unusability pessimists argue that we should reject the traditional pessimistic stance that knowledge of aesthetic matters is unavailable via testimony in favour of the view that while such knowledge is available to us, it is unusable. This unusability stems from the fact that accepting such testimony would violate an important non‐epistemic norm of belief formation. In this article I present an objection to unusability pessimism and argue that Robert Hopkins, the view's most prominent defender, fails to motivate adequately the claim that there are such non‐epistemic belief norms. The cases which putatively legitimize usability norms can be explained by appeal to more familiar norm types: epistemic norms of belief formation, and non‐epistemic norms which govern action other than belief formation. The intent of this article is not primarily negative, however, and I will also argue that understanding why the unusability position fails helps us to identify a promising new direction for the pessimist's opponents who wish to defend the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony.

show abstract

Taste Fragmentalism

Spolaore,

Iaquinto,

Torrengo

2023

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine’s fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted—in an absolute manner—by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb’s being tasty and the state of rhubarb’s being distasteful) can both constitute reality in an absolute manner, although no agent can have joint access to both states. We will then develop a formalised version of our view by means of an exact truthmaker semantics for taste assertions. Within this framework—we argue—our linguistic and inferential practices concerning cases of faultless disagreement are elegantly vindicated, thus suggesting that taste fragmentalism is worth of further consideration.

show abstract

The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value

Cited by 37 publications

References 2 publications

Aesthetic Testimony

Aesthetic Testimony

Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation

Taste Fragmentalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About