Aesthetic Testimony

Abstract

It is frequently claimed that we can learn very little, if anything, about the aesthetic character of an artwork (or other object of aesthetic appraisal) on the basis of testimony. Such disparaging assessments of the epistemic value of aesthetic testimony contrast markedly with our acceptance of testimony as an important (perhaps even basic) source of knowledge in many other areas. There have, however, been a number of challenges to this orthodoxy of late; from those who seek to deny that such a contrast exists (optimists) as well as attempts by those who accept the distinction (pessimists) to provide an explanation and defence of the contrast. In , I outline a little of the nature and history of the debate over aesthetic testimony. , focuses on the opposing positions on aesthetic testimony, optimism and pessimism, and takes steps to clarify what exactly is at issue between them. In , I survey considerations which have been adduced in favour of pessimism ranging from brute appeal to intuition to complex argumentation before turning in , to look at motivations for optimism. Finally, in , I consider some alternative views which claim that, for a variety of reasons, it is a mistake to construe the debate over aesthetic testimony as concerned (or at least as primarily concerned) with the epistemic standing of aesthetic beliefs formed on the basis of testimony.

The Emergence of the Modern Mind: An Evolutionary Perspective on Aesthetic Experience

“…(The idea that proper aesthetic evaluations are governed by a principle in the spirit of acquaintance has "something like the status of orthodoxy," and it is usually conceived to be "something akin to a truism.") 24 Above all, opponents generally do not deny that there is a crucial difference between the cognitive states of the person who directly perceives the artwork and the person who derives his judgment from a secondhand description. 25 On the other hand, the recent version of pessimism rejects the "unavailability option" (testimony does not make knowledge available at all) and embraces the "usability pessimism": testimony alone cannot be the sole basis of the aesthetic judgment, but it may have an important role as signaling information in arriving at our aesthetic judgments.…”

Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater

“…10 and 11) for anti-Cartesianism about intuitions, and 13 Pollock and Cruz (1999) for anti-Cartesianism about memory experiences. And see (Robson, 2012) for a review of loosely related issues concerning aesthetic experience, including Wollheim's (1980, p.233) Acquaintance Principle.…”

De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment

“…On the one hand, we seem to consider that aesthetic judgments are the mere results and expressions of personal and individual experiences. This is what underlies everyday sayings such as “to each his/her taste” and “it's only a matter of taste.” This is also what is revealed, according to certain philosophers, by the fact that we do not value aesthetic testimony and have the intuition that one cannot know whether a certain object or person is beautiful if one has not personally experienced it (see Robson, , for a review). On the other hand, we seem to think that certain aesthetic judgments are better than others, as shown by our willingness to distinguish between “good taste” and “bad taste.” This is also supposed to be the presupposition that makes certain practices intelligible, such as the fact that people discuss and argue about the aesthetic qualities of objects (Kivy, ).…”