De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment

Abstract

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general.

On Wyatt's Absolutist Account of Faultless Disagreement in Matters of Personal Taste

“…Moreover, it is totally rational for a subject to believe and assert about an item that it is disgusting (e.g., vomit, faeces) even though they lack the subjective evidence mediated by first‐hand experience of its taste. In this regard, the empirical data confirm that, when the items in question are highly disgusting, the subjects uniformly categorize them in this manner, and that, despite the unavailable evidence which would be provided by direct experience, the subjects ascribe truth‐values to beliefs and assertions about the items they find disgusting (Cova and Ravat, 2008; Cova et al, 2019, p. 336). Such cases are problematic for Wyatt's insistence that subjects have first‐hand evidence triggered by their experiences of flavours, and that they know that they have it.…”

“…Hence, as the reader can confirm, expressivism is theoretically consistent with the negations of each of (a)–(d) displayed above. Although the empirical data presented by Cova and Pain did not rule out an expressivist reading (2012, p. 246; p. 256), there are also some recent results which have replicated the former experimental findings, confirming that the data related to aesthetic evaluations are not only concordant with expressivism (Cova et al, 2019, p. 335) but also that they can be successfully explained by such a framework (Rabb et al, 2020). Now, Wyatt admits at the beginning of the paper that expressivism is outside the purview of his paper (Wyatt, 2018, p. 254, footnote 5).…”

De gustibus est disputandum: An empirical investigation of the folk concept of aesthetic taste

“…So far, all studies seem to converge towards the following conclusion: most people seem to think that aesthetic properties only exist in the eyes of the beholder (Beebe et al, 2015(Beebe et al, , 2016Cova, 2018;Cova & Pain, 2012;Cova et al, 2019;Goodwin & Darley, 2008Murray, 2020;Rabb et al, 2020). Indeed, when presented with two people making contradictory aesthetic judgments, most people consider either that "both people are right" or that "neither is right and neither is wrong", because it makes no sense to speak of being right or wrong about such things.…”

Aesthetic sense and social cognition: a story from the Early Stone Age

“…507-508.47 It may also account for what has been called the vice of snobbery in aesthetic appreciation(Kieran 2010), and hence be a reason why aesthetic appreciation is rather fragile.48 On much we are in agreement with Walton: "An appreciator's enjoyable admiration, usually if not always, involves not only recognizing a thing's value-recognizing the marvelous job it does of opening our eyes to important truths, for instance, or how wonderfully suited it is for providing safe and efficient transportation; one's admiration also involves recognizing the creator's accomplishment, the talent and skill a person demonstrated by producing something with this value"(Walton 1993, p. 506). 49 James Shelley, Aesthetic Judgment, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https ://plato .stanf ord.edu/ entri es/aesth etic-judgm ent/#Norm.50 Cova et al (2019): The highest proportion of objectivist responses was found in South and Southeast Asian respondents (22.0%).…”

“…Cova et al (2019): A third response "Both of you are correct" was favoured by 41%.52 Korsgaard (1983, p. 185). For the aesthetics of non-art objects and the tendency to see art objects as central cases of the aesthetic, seeSaito (2007, pp.…”