The Exemplification of Rules: An Appraisal of Pettit’s Approach to the Problem of Rule-following

Watts, Daniel

doi:10.1080/09672559.2011.631146

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

2012

DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2011.631146

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The Exemplification of Rules: An Appraisal of Pettit’s Approach to the Problem of Rule-following

Daniel Watts

Abstract: This paper offers an appraisal of Phillip Pettit's approach to the problem how a merely finite set of examples can serve to represent a determinate rule, given that indefinitely many rules can be extrapolated from any such set. I argue that Pettit's so-called ethocentric theory of rule-following fails to deliver the solution to this problem he sets out to provide. More constructively, I consider what further provisions are needed in order to advance Pettit's general approach to the problem. I conclude that wha… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications

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References 16 publications

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“… Boghossian (: 517); Pettit (: 3); Kripke (: 24). For a critical perspective on the rule‐conforming/rule‐following distinction, see Boghossian (), which in this regard repudiates Boghossian (); Gert (); Ginsborg (); Watts (). …”

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Kierkegaard, Repetition and Ethical Constancy

Watts

2017

Philosophical Investigations

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How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of crisis, in which our ethical selfunderstanding is radically undermined.

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Kierkegaard, Repetition and Ethical Constancy

Watts

2017

Philosophical Investigations

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“…See also Korsgaard : 107; Crowell . For an application of a similar line of objection to Phillip Pettit's account of rule‐following, see Watts .…”

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Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein

Watts

2017

European J of Philosophy

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My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a central line of argument in Wittgenstein that problematizes this question by establishing the basis our ability to follow rules in our spontaneous responses. I argue that Kierkegaard not only strongly anticipates this line of argument but also offers a distinctive story about what, at bottom, makes the difference between human rule‐following and behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. In a word, on Kierkegaard's story, what makes the difference is: anxiety.

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The virtue of error: Solved games and ethical deliberation

McNeill

2020

European J of Philosophy

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In this paper, I argue that genuine ethical deliberation, and hence ethical agency, is incompatible in principle with the possession of determinate practical prescriptions concerning how best to act in a concrete ethical situation. I make this argument principally by way of an analogy between gameplay and ethical deliberation. I argue that trivially solved games of perfect information (the example I use is tic-tac-toe) are, or become, in some sense unplayable for the individual for whom the game is trivially solved. The reason for this, I suggest, is that there ceases to be space within the game for the distinction between that individual being a better and being a worse player of the game. I then use this example as an occasion to reflect on the kind of epistemic indeterminacy that appears to be a condition of genuine ethical deliberation. 1 | INTRODUCTION Under certain conditions and to some extent, ignorance undermines moral responsibility. This is one of the oldest and most widely held intuitions about agency, and the debate about what kind of ignorance is morally exculpatory (and under what conditions and to what extent it is exculpatory) shows no sign of abating. In this paper, however, I propose to discuss a threat to agency from the other end of the epistemic spectrum. The issue with which I will be concerned is the kind of knowledge that is compatible with ethical deliberation and agency and with the kind of knowledge that is not so compatible. More specifically, I will argue that deliberation and agency are incompatible with the kind of knowledge that would provide its possessor with determinate prescriptions concerning how best to act in a concrete ethical situation. And I do so principally by way of an analogy. The analogy is one between game playing and ethical deliberation. I argue that trivially solved games of perfect information (the example I use is tic-tac-toe or noughts and crosses) are, or become, in some sense unplayable for the individual for whom the game is trivially solved. I claim that if the game is solved for you, if you know with perfect or near perfect reliability what you ought to do in the game, you cannot play the game anymore. It may look like you are playing

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The Exemplification of Rules: An Appraisal of Pettit’s Approach to the Problem of Rule-following

Cited by 4 publications

References 16 publications

Kierkegaard, Repetition and Ethical Constancy

Kierkegaard, Repetition and Ethical Constancy

Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein

The virtue of error: Solved games and ethical deliberation

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