Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein

Abstract

My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a central line of argument in Wittgenstein that problematizes this question by establishing the basis our ability to follow rules in our spontaneous responses. I argue that Kierkegaard not only strongly anticipates this line of argument but also offers a distinctive story about what, at bottom, makes the difference between human rule‐following and behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. In a word, on Kierkegaard's story, what makes the difference is: anxiety.

Kierkegaard, Repetition and Ethical Constancy

“…Plausibly, the insight that rule‐following is ultimately founded in our primitive human responses is a major source of the philosophical affinity between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. For a discussion of this affinity, see Watts ().…”