The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in a Multiparty Presidential Regime

Abstract

How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding contextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the two presidential "tools"-pork and coalition goods-are substitutable resources, with pork functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president's bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.

Coalizões de governo: uma medida de concentração alternativa

“…Apesar da existência de outras ferramentas à disposição do Executivo, a literatura aponta que a formação da coalizão pautada nas alianças interpartidárias para composição dos gabinetes é uma moeda de troca fundamental para o presidente angariar o apoio necessário no legislativo (Abranches, 1998;Amorim, 2000;Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999;Melo, 2002;Pereira et al, 2011). Amorim (2000) destaca que o formato de um gabinete presidencial não está sujeito exclusivamente à quantidade de partidos e a ter ou não o controle da maioria de cadeiras no parlamento.…”

Pagando o preço de governar: custos de gerência de coalizão no presidencialismo brasileiro

“…The president strategically distributes such resources to parties and legislators (Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh, 2004;Raile, Pereira and Power, 2010;Zucco, 2009), but it is unclear the size of the resources distributed and how they change over time.…”

“…Despite this pessimistic panorama (Power, 2010), the Brazilian presidential system has presented relevant results, such as economic growth, stability, social inclusion -even though it has dissipative characteristics (Alston et al, 2013) -and, above all, continuity and stability in the democratic game.…”

“…They are responsible for deciding the parties with whom they will govern and how they will allocate the resources in terms of power and finances to the ally parties. The president holds a vast "toolbox" (Raile, Pereira and Power, 2010) to manage coalitions. Therefore, understanding the game between partners in multi-party coalitions is central, considering that, despite the possible costs, this game generates several possibilities of exchange gains and cooperation over time between political actors (Pereira and Melo, 2012).…”

The Changing Role of Ministers in the Legislative Agenda in Brazil

“…In principal, presidents in Brazil do not need to spend much effort in stimulating the collaboration of coalition members because the constitution concentrates power in the presidency, granting it many tools to negotiate directly with parties and representatives in Congress (Raile et al, 2011;Martinez-Gallardo, 2012). As a consequence, Brazil is a case of extreme cabinet instability in Latin America (Martinez-Gallardo, 2012).…”