The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Sustainable Cooperation Relationship of Collaborative Innovation Network in Strategic Emerging Industries

Abstract

Strategic emerging industries (SEIs) represent the future direction of industrial developments and are crucial in stimulating the overall and long-term development for economy and society. The government plays a key role in promoting the development of SEIs. This paper, for the first time, investigates the cooperation relationship among innovation members, such as enterprises, universities and research institutes in a collaborative innovation network of strategic emerging industries under government intervention. A three-population evolutionary game theory approach was employed under different scenarios for the government acting as the stakeholder, considering the non-profit, definite fit as well as uncertain profit when incentive and punishment policies are adopted. A novel evolutionary game model of the cooperation relationship among collaborative innovation network members under government’s intervention is established. The results of the simulation experiments show that government’s intervention significantly influences the cooperation relationship between enterprises, universities and research institutes. When the sum of financial incentives and punishments is greater than the total additional cost (TAC), enterprises, universities and research institutes should pay for collaborative innovation. Moreover, government’s financial intervention can effectively promote the cooperation between enterprises, universities and research institutes.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Sharing in Low-Carbon Innovation Network

“…At present, scholars have used the network evolution game method when studying the diffusion of low-carbon innovation technology. Liu and Yang [11] regarded the technology diffusion carrier as a scale-free network, constructed a game matrix for innovation adoption under the regulation of market mechanism and evolutionary game model, and then constructed a complex network evolutionary game model for analysis. Yuan et al [12] regarded traditional network clusters as small-world networks and established the main low-carbon strategy update rules on the basis of exploring the learning model of the main clusters.…”

Environmental Governance Cooperative Behavior among Enterprises with Reputation Effect Based on Complex Networks Evolutionary Game Model

“…In order to simplify, we set µ = g max k, then e i = µq i . And we suppose that the pollution controlling cost of enterprises is quadratic function of quantity of pollution control, so the controlling cost of enterprise who selects strategy C or strategy U are respectively 1 2 γ(µq i ) 2 and 1 2 γ(λ E µq i ) 2 . According to the inverse demand function with environmental preference and the variables above, we can calculate the payoff of the enterprise, taking enterprise i for instance, under different strategy selections as follows:…”

“…However, the diffusivity of environmental pollution leads to a significant positive externality of the environmental governance behavior of enterprises. As a result, some enterprises have the motivation to be free riders, that is, they do not pay the cost of environmental pollution governance, but they can share the benefit of pollution reduction [1]. Therefore, for environmental pollution governance, it is difficult to improve the governance performance only by relying on a single enterprise alone, and effective goal for environmental governance can be achieved through cooperation among enterprises [2].…”

Evaluating the Minor Coarse Cereals Product Crowdfunding Platform through Evolutionary Game Analysis

“…The authors of [42] studied corporate power by evolutionary game theory and mainstream economics and also used evolutionary game theory to compare corporate power with mainstream economics. Liu et al [43] used evolutionary games to research the sustainability of collaborative innovation in strategic emerging industries. Now evolutionary games theory has been widely used in the fields of economy, management, and supervision [33,44].…”