The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time

Connolly, Michelle; Sá, Nelson; Zaman, Azeem; Roark, Christopher; Trivedi, Akshaya

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2928332

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Competitive Environment1

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2023

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Cited by 4 publications

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“…Typically, different functions of number of bidders have been used, as that quantity had been shown both, theoretically and empirically, to impact license prices (Brannman, Klein, & Weiss, 1987). For example, Madden et al (2014) use number of bidders and number of active rounds on a license to control for competition, Connolly, Sá, Zaman, Roark, and Trivedi (2018) include a quadratic function of number of bidders in their regressions, while Yordanov (2017) takes the logarithm of number of bidders. In contrast, Ausubel et al (1997) depart from those approaches by using a continuous measure.…”

Section: Competitive Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of bidding agreements in the US radio frequency auctions

Tęcza

2023

SSRN Journal

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Section: Competitive Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of bidding agreements in the US radio frequency auctions

Tęcza

2023

SSRN Journal

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Common Wealth Dividends, Generalized

Ranalli¹

2021

Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee

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The role of bidding agreements in the US radio frequency auctions

Tęcza

2023

Preprint

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In the US spectrum auctions which allocate radio frequency rights to the private sector, firms are allowed to form multilateral bidding agreements. These agreements explicitly allow bidders to discuss their strategies and bids. Using public auction- and firm-level data from the Federal Communications Commission, I empirically investigate whether the bidding agreement rule leads to differential auction outcomes for firms that are members of such agreements, versus other firms. I find that firms which are member of a bidding agreement, bid more aggressively and pay up to 43% higher prices than firms who have no such agreements. Moreover, results of further empirical tests do not support the hypothesis that bidding agreements result in anti-competitive behavior. In contrast, I find suggestive evidence in favor of a resource pooling argument. Consequently, the regulator's rule of permitting bidding agreements appears to be justified on economic grounds, and should be reinstated in future frequency auctions. My result corroborates findings of earlier empirical studies on joint bidding, conducted in other types of auctions. JEL codes: D44, L24, L40, L86, L96

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The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time

Cited by 4 publications

References 30 publications

The role of bidding agreements in the US radio frequency auctions

The role of bidding agreements in the US radio frequency auctions

Common Wealth Dividends, Generalized

The role of bidding agreements in the US radio frequency auctions

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