The evolution of disputes

Gochman, Charles S.

doi:10.1080/03050629308434819

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 110 publications

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“…Research suggests that where states are contiguous, the opportunity for conflict and the propensity to engage in conflict are increased (Goertz and Diehl 1992;Gochman 1993; Bueno de Mesquita 1981). Further, dispute escalation is physically easier (and more probable) between contiguous states than between states which are far apart (Diehl 1985).…”

Section: Hypotheses and Statistical Controlsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…The number of participants in disputes is correlated with the hostility level; more hostile environments do not bode well for dispute resolution (Gochman 1993;Gochman and Maoz 1984). Additionally, more disputants potentially bring more issues and more demands into the dispute making resolution more difficult and dispute length greater.…”

Section: Hypotheses and Statistical Controlsmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congruence and U.S. Dispute Behavior

Clark

2000

Political Research Quarterly

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Domestic and international politics are linked so that domestic structure and domestic political preferences affect international conflict behavior. In particular, states' policy preferences can be characterized by the congruence of policy preferences between political institutions. As a state's policy preferences become more congruent, as policy preferences between political institutions are more similar, the state's conflict behavior changes. I hypothesize that as the domestic political institutions in a state share similar policy preferences or policy goals, disputes become more likely and tend to last longer. I employ event count and continuous-time hazard models to analyze U.S. conflict propensity and conflict duration during the period 1945-1992. Using the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (version 2.1), I model U.S. militarized dispute behavior as a function of congruence between the policy preferences of the U.S. President and the Congress. The models reveal a strong relationship between preference congruence and both the amount of conflict and the duration of the disputes in which the U.S. engages. The congruence hypotheses are robust across a variety of measures. The results add substantial strength and substance to claims that domestic political characteristics affect international conflict. The theory and empirical analyses also refine the domestic-international linkage by allowing scholars to consider the effect of normal political change in a single state on that state's foreign policy decisions.

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Section: Hypotheses and Statistical Controlsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Hypotheses and Statistical Controlsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congruence and U.S. Dispute Behavior

Clark

2000

Political Research Quarterly

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“…Wallensteen evaluated this dichotomy and found that periods of "universalism" did indeed see less major power war than periods of "particularism" (1984). Thanks to this finding, the concept influenced several subsequent studies of peace and conflict as a systemic factor contributing to peace (Gochman 1993;Raymond 1997;Vasquez and Gibler 2001;Siverson and Ward 2000;Chan 2005;Delahunty 2007;Senese and Vasquez 2008;Vasquez and Kang 2012;Valeriano and Maness 2015). There were also numerous studies that used the "universalismparticularism" variable in empirical evaluations.…”

Section: The Legacy Of "Universalism-particularism"mentioning

confidence: 91%

From Universalism to Managerial Coordination: Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force

Travlos¹

2016

AISR

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Cooperation among major powers in order to regulate an aspect of international relations has been central to questions of global governance. In peace science the focus has been on the efficacy of major power regulation of the use of force. However, fruitful study requires variables that can capture the quality of major power regulation of the use of force. To provide such an instrument I use Peter Wallensteen’s “universalism-particularism” variable-concept as the foundation. On it I built the concept of managerial coordination and the instrument that captures its quality, the scale of interstate managerial coordination (IMaC). Using IMaC, puzzling prior findings concerning major power regulation and minor power conflict are shown to be artifacts of operationalization.

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“…There are situations in which the appropriate number of stages is an open question and one that is arguably empirical in nature. For instance, within the interstate conflict literature, some have suggested three stages (H&A 2002; Reed 2000) versus five stages (Gochman 1993) versus six stages (Bloomfield and Leiss 1969; Rummel 1976, chap. 15).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating Conflict Dynamics

Jones

Metzger

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Interest in processes has become increasingly pronounced in international conflict research in recent years, especially how these processes unfold across time “dynamics”. We focus in particular on “stage conceptions” of dynamics: processes that unfold over a series of sequential, and possibly recurrent, stages. We suggest that stage conceptions have two key properties: plurisectality and conditional covariate effects. We propose a novel econometric application to quantitatively assess claims regarding stage conceptions of dynamics: survival modeling. Specifically, we use multistate models to examine how a process evolves through its individual stages, and also whether covariate effects differ across these stages. We use Huth and Allee’s territorial dispute data to demonstrate the importance of conceptualizing conflict as a dynamic process, as well as empirically modeling it as such. We show democracy has different effects on dispute resolution, depending on the dispute’s stage, but that these different effects disappear after time passes.

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The evolution of disputes

Cited by 15 publications

References 110 publications

Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congruence and U.S. Dispute Behavior

Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congruence and U.S. Dispute Behavior

From Universalism to Managerial Coordination: Major Power Regulation of the Use of Force

Evaluating Conflict Dynamics

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