Evaluating Conflict Dynamics

Jones, Benjamin; Metzger, Shawna K.

doi:10.1177/0022002716656448

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 67 publications

(71 reference statements)

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“…Multistate duration models evaluate duration processes in which subjects can transition between multiple states of the world (de Wreede, Fiocco, and Putter 2011; Metzger and Jones 2016). While new to political science, such models have been used to analyze the development and reversal of nuclear weapons programs (Mattiacci and Jones 2016) and the escalation and resolution of territorial disputes (Jones and Metzger 2018).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Birth Legacies and State Failure

Carter

Lemke

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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We argue patterns of state failure are influenced by variation in how states emerged as independent political actors. In particular, states with positive birth legacies, those whose emergence required relatively high levels of capacity and legitimacy, should be less likely to experience state failure than countries that experienced less auspicious births. We assess this claim on the universe of states in the international system between 1950 and 2002 with multistate duration models that estimate the probabilities states transition into and out of periods of failure. We find that states with positive birth legacies are less likely to experience state failure and that this relationship is driven by states with positive birth legacies being able to more quickly transition from failure back to being functioning states. Our findings offer evidence that state failure is usefully thought of in the context of state-making processes and show that how states emerge as independent actors influences phenomena central to comparative and international politics.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Birth Legacies and State Failure

Carter

Lemke

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Produksjonen av empiriske funn har vaert imponerende. Noen har fokusert på geografiske egenskaper som avstand og typografi (Gleditsch & Singer, 1975;Diehl, 1985;Holsti, 1991;Kocs, 1995;Vasquez, 1995;Starr & Thomas, 2002), andre på styresett og demokratimål (Huth & Allee, 2002;Powell & Wiegand, 2010;Jones & Metzger, 2018), mens et tredje spor har vaert å utforske hvilke typer økonomiske, strategiske og symbolske verdier ved et territorium som øker sannsynligheten for maktbruk eller delelinjeavtale (Huth, 1996;Hensel & Mitchell, 2005;Gibler, 2007;Sorens, 2011). Et godt sammendrag av de ulike korrelatene er å finne i Toft (2014, s. 186-189).…”

Section: Empiriske Funnunclassified

Nettverk-signalisering: en dynamisk modell for taktikkskifter i grensetvister

Schram¹

2020

Internasjonal Politikk

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Når og hvorfor velger stater å bruke militærmakt i grensetvister? Artikkelen argumenterer for at kvantitative studier av grensetvister i internasjonale relasjoner (IR) i for stor grad har fokusert på statiske forklaringsvariabler. For å forstå taktikkskifter må vi isolere hendelsesdynamikker, ikke konstante egenskaper. Paul Huths innflytelsesrike «nettverksmodell» åpner for nettopp dette, men jeg finner at dens logikk er ustø og dens empiriske støtte tvilsom. I stedet foreslår jeg en alternativ mekanisme, inspirert av Barbara Walters borgerkrigteori: En truet stat har et akutt behov for å signalisere kampvilje, og grensetvister er ideelle «scener» for slike signaler. Dermed kan vi forvente aggressive taktikkskifter innad i tvister like etter at eksterne trusler inntreffer – stikk i strid med Huths modell. Jeg tester de to hypotesene på et datamateriale om Kinas konfliktnettverk mellom 1954 og 2005. Mer omfattende tester er nødvendig for å fastslå modellens forklaringskraft, men dette materialet gir ettertrykkelig støtte til mitt argument. Sannsynligheten for at Kina ville militarisere en grensetvist mer enn tredoblet seg i ukene etter at Beijing ble utfordret militært av en eller flere utenforstående stater. Resultatet er uforenlig med litteraturens dominerende tese og styrker dermed oppfatningen av statiske forklaringsvariabler som utilstrekkelige for å kartlegge rykk og napp mellom fred og aggresjon i internasjonale grensetvister. Abstract in EnglishFrom Peace to Fury: Reframing Tactical Shifts in Territorial DisputesWhen and why do states violently contend their territorial claims? I argue that the quantitative literature in IR stands ill-prepared to solve this puzzle due to an endemic appetite for static variables. Territorial disputes escalate because states’ tactics shift; to grasp the dynamic sequences spurring those shifts is therefore critical. Paul K. Huth’s network approach provides a powerful starting point, and I interrogate his hypothesis that threatened states acquiesce in disputes. The inference is both theoretically misplaced and empirically dubious, I find. Yet by injecting the Schellingian logic of ‘commitment-signalling’, drawing on Barbara Walter’s theory of civil wars, I recast Huth’s model: tactical shifts are aggressive, not conciliatory, when states perceive outside threats. I test this antithesis using a sequence-sensitive logistic regression model, employing China’s territorial-dispute history between 1954 and 2005 as a crucial-case experiment. Strong evidence favours this paper’s argument. That has implications for further research. My Network-Signalling model has promise and should be tested more extensively.

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“…Diplomatic negotiations must therefore represent a central element in understanding how, when, and why many international conflicts come to an end short of total victory or defeat. Recent research has emphasized that negotiations constitute a distinct stage of the conflict resolution process, and we have increasingly deeper insight into belligerents’ decisions to initiate talks during war (Findley 2012; Jones and Metzger 2018; Kaplow 2016). That said, we know far less about what happens once negotiations begin and how the battlefield dynamically affects the nature of subsequent discussions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Painful Words: The Effect of Battlefield Activity on Conflict Negotiation Behavior

Min

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How does battlefield activity affect belligerents’ behavior during wartime negotiations? While scholars have studied when and why warring parties choose to negotiate, few insights explain what negotiators do once seated at the table. I argue that actors engage in obstinate negotiation behavior to signal resolve when undergoing contentious and indeterminate hostilities. I explore this claim by analyzing all negotiation transcripts and associated daily military operations reports from the Korean War. Using text-based, machine learning, and statistical methods, I show that high levels of movement or casualties in isolation produce clear information on future trends, thus yielding more substantive negotiations, while more turbulent activity featuring high movement and casualties in tandem produces cynical negotiations. Moving past contemporary literature, this study explores micro-level dynamics of conflict and diplomacy, builds a theoretical bridge between two perennial views of negotiation, and provides a framework for studying war by applying computational methods to archival documents.

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Evaluating Conflict Dynamics

Cited by 9 publications

References 67 publications

Birth Legacies and State Failure

Birth Legacies and State Failure

Nettverk-signalisering: en dynamisk modell for taktikkskifter i grensetvister

Painful Words: The Effect of Battlefield Activity on Conflict Negotiation Behavior

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