The Evil of Death Revisited

Silverstein, Harry S.

doi:10.1111/1475-4975.00025

Cited by 39 publications

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“…Bradley (, p. 86). Feit (), Lamont (), and Silverstein () agree that this is the relevant question posed by Epicurus about the badness of death. Hanser does not explicitly raise this point, but the above passage indicates that he would endorse this version of the Epicurean challenge.…”

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Accounting for the Harm of Death

Purves¹

2014

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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I defend a theory of the way in which death is a harm to the person who dies that (i) fits into a larger, unified account of harm (so that death is not a special kind of harm but is harmful in the same way that any harmful event is harmful); and (ii) includes an account of the time of death's harmfulness, one that avoids the implications that death is a timeless harm and that people have levels of welfare at times at which they do not exist.

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“…Steven Luper (, pp. 239–51); Harry Silverstein (, pp. 116–34); John Bigelow, John Campbell, and Robert Pargetter (, pp.…”

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Accounting for the Harm of Death

Purves¹

2014

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Death

Fischer¹

2013

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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Death has inspired much philosophical literature to go along with the existential dread. Indeed, much of the literature has explored the issue of whether the dread is justified; Epicurus and his followers argued that it is not, as they hold that death cannot be bad for the individual who dies ( see Stoicism). Although the Epicurean view seems unacceptable to most contemporary philosophers, it has its adherents, and many would at least concede that one can learn much from seeking to refute Epicureanism about death.

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On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

Deng

2015

Philosophia

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In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In 'Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?', Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin's understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn't be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn't isolate the source of that tension. The real question is how to understand Le Poidevin's idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are 'eternally real'. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin's remarks, albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal entities to exist in a totum simul.

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The Evil of Death Revisited

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Cited by 39 publications

References 3 publications

Accounting for the Harm of Death

Accounting for the Harm of Death

Death

On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

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