Accounting for the Harm of Death

Purves, Duncan

doi:10.1111/papq.12031

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 37 publications

(41 reference statements)

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“…13 Feinberg (1984), Feldman (1991), McMahan (2002), Bradley (2012), and Feit (2015). 14 See, e.g., Feldman (1991), McMahan (2002), Bradley (2004), and Purves (2016). 15 Here one's identity necessarily relates to one's genetic make-up such that it holds across all possible worlds, and hence, one could not have been born without a genetic congenital harm without being a different person (Parfit 1987).…”

Section: The Case For a Non-comparative Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

Villiers-Botha

2020

Sats

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In recent attempts to define “harm,” comparative accounts of harm, specifically counterfactual comparative accounts, have been touted as the most promising approaches to defining the concept. Nevertheless, such accounts face serious difficulties. This has led to the call for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call, arguing that non-comparative approaches to defining harm have not been sufficiently explored. I develop such an account and claim that it avoids the difficulties faced by comparative accounts while not presupposing a substantive theory of well-being, which is taken as a key failing of non-comparative accounts. I conclude that this definition renders a concept of harm that can be meaningfully employed in our moral discourse.

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Section: The Case For a Non-comparative Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

Villiers-Botha

2020

Sats

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“…Den ene gruppen aksepterer -i likhet med Epikur -at døden ikke kan vaere negativ for den som dør (f.eks. Rosenbaum, 1986). La oss kalle det synet for epikurisme.…”

Section: Epikur I Antikkenunclassified

“…Gitt den sekulaere forståelsen av døden som debatten legger til grunn, så er det ingen som kan bli kausalt påvirket av å «vaere død». Følgelig så kan døden ikke vaere eller ha vaert negativ for den avdøde (Rosenbaum, 1986). På lignende vis hevder enkelte at et subjekt må vaere til stede for at noe skal vaere positivt eller negativt for det subjektet.…”

Section: Epikur I Antikkenunclassified

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Døden som et onde

Solberg

2019

NFT

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Carl Tollef Solberg er utdannet lege og filosof. Turnustjenesten som lege utførte han ved Ahus Universitetssykehus. Doktorgraden handler om hvordan vi bør evaluere dødsfall innen global helse. Solberg har publisert artikler som omhandler døden, helseprioriteringer og andre temaer innen medisinsk etikk. Sammen med Espen Gamlund har han utgitt boken Saving People from the Harm of Death på Oxford University Press.

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“…4. But see Bradley (2009) and Feit (2016) for defenses of the view that the dead have levels of well-being. See Johansson (2013) and Purves (2016) for objections to Bradley. See Carlson and Johansson (forthcoming) for a reply to Feit.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Desire satisfaction, death, and time

Purves

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.

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Accounting for the Harm of Death

Cited by 15 publications

References 37 publications

Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm

Døden som et onde

Desire satisfaction, death, and time

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