The EU–Turkey deal in the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’: when intergovernmentalism cast a shadow on the EU’s normative power

Gürkan, Seda; Coman, Ramona

doi:10.1057/s41269-020-00184-2

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 39 publications

(30 reference statements)

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“…This would likely be perceived by the public as a relief for their national welfare state (for welfare chauvinism literature concerning Eastern European workers in western member states, see Eick and Larsen, 2022). Such ways of thinking also appear in other contexts, such as the EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan during the so-called refugee crisis of 2015–2016, which permitted the denial of entry to refugees who were arriving by way of the Aegean Sea and consequently kept millions of refugees outside the EU, and particularly outside more generous welfare states (Gürkan and Coman, 2021). This leads to two additional hypotheses: H3a: In countries with more generous welfare policies the SES cleavage on welfare Euroscepticism is smaller . H3b: In countries with less welfare chauvinist policies the SES cleavage on welfare Euroscepticism is smaller .…”

Section: The Role Of Welfare Opposition and Welfare Chauvinismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare Euroscepticism and socioeconomic status

Eick

2024

Journal of European Social Policy

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While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as ‘welfare Euroscepticism’. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this article aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. Contrary to the literature on public support for European integration, this article argues that higher SES groups are more likely to be welfare Eurosceptics than lower SES groups. This argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states, using the example of a potential EU-wide minimum income scheme. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasize the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall, the results indicate much potential to mobilize the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, that is, lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies that their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The article also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.

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Section: The Role Of Welfare Opposition and Welfare Chauvinismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Welfare Euroscepticism and socioeconomic status

Eick

2024

Journal of European Social Policy

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“…Given these basic specifications of the EUTD, related political science analyses, especially international relations focus on points 1–4. Many articles conclude that by outsourcing the management of migration flows to Turkey, the EU is not assuming its fair share of responsibility for refugee protection (Heck and Hess 2017; Aydin-Düzgit, Keyman, and Biehl 2019; Gürkan and Coman 2021). Kfir (2018, 207) argues that the EU becomes even more dependent on the Turkish government as an ambivalent partner: “Because EU cares more about Turkey serving as an obstacle to those seeking refuge in Europe, it has empowered the Erdogan regime to continue to take and implement measures that undermine Turkish democracy.” Bialasiewicz and Maessen (2018) conclude that the EUTD enforces a geographical divide between the EU and Turkey concerning access to legal and humanitarian protection.…”

Section: Literature Review: the Eutd In Social Science Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Between Humanitarian Assistance and Externalizing of EU Borders: The EU-Turkey Deal and Refugee Related Organizations in Turkey

Pries

Savci

2023

Journal on Migration and Human Security

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This paper examines whether multilevel transnational cooperation makes a difference in refugee protection, especially in protracted displacement. In response to the forced migration of millions of Syrians to Turkey starting in 2011, the EU and Turkish government published a joint statement in March 2016. The so-called EU-Turkey deal (EUTD) provided a substantial flow of money (EUR 6 billion in four years) from the EU to Turkey. In return Turkey had to commit to contain and control migration movement toward the EU. In social science, there are quite diverse evaluations of the EUTD. Whereas some studies focus on its effectiveness and efficiency in reaching the outlined goals, other publications stress its geo-political effects on migrants’ mobility and (externalized) border control. Meanwhile some studies look for points to improve the EUTD while others criticize it fundamentally. This article analyzes the involvement of different types of international governmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and INGOs) in the four main action fields of the EUTD and its implicit side effects on the Turkish regime of migration management. It first summarizes some crucial findings and pending questions in the social science literature. Based on analysis of available documents and our own interviews in Turkey, we then shed light on the organizations involved in the implementation of the EUTD and its effects on the Turkish regime of refugee protection. In 2022, Turkey hosted some 3.7 million Syrian refugees of a total of almost four million registered international forced migrants. The EUTD of 2016 was mainly a response by the EU to the large numbers of Syrian refugees arriving in its members’ territories. When more than 1.2 million asylum seekers were registered in the then EU-28 in 2015 alone — more than twice the number in the preceding year — some EU member states (MS) negotiated with the Turkish government (Eurostat 2015, 2016). Based on a meeting of the European Council and its “Turkish counterpart” the so-called “EU-Turkey statement” was published on March 18 in 2015 (European Council 2016). From the very beginning, this EUTD was controversial — both in public discussions and in the social science literature. Was it primarily a payment from the EU to the Turkish government for externalizing its responsibilities of refugee protection? Or was it an appropriate measure for sharing the burden of an urgent humanitarian crisis? Was the money spent for refugee-oriented humanitarian aid and development expenses or was it instrumentalized by the Turkish government for its own ends? How did refugee related IGOs and INGOs participate in the management of the EUTD? In the following sections, we focus on some selected aspects of the role of national and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations active in the field of refugee protection, specifically the role and cooperation dynamics of these refugee related organizations (RRO) in implementing the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) as part of the EUTD. Based on expert interviews in Turkey and an analysis of spending under the EUTD, the paper analyzes (1) how the landscape of RROs developed in the context of the EUTD, (2) how the budget of the EUTD was spent, and (3) how the cooperation between these RROs developed. The paper adds new insights into the contradictory dynamics between organizing services for refugees and controlling and containing refugee movements to the EU, between assisting and instrumentalizing forced migrants in Turkey, and between humanitarian aid and development activities. Especially the last point is relevant for contexts of protracted displacement as instruments of immediate humanitarian assistance have to be combined with means of longer-term development. From a perspective of organizational sociology, it argues that the EUTD contributed to a multi-level transnational organizational field of refugee protection, where collective and corporate actors relate in conflict and cooperation between the poles of rational self-interests and mutually recognized norms, between control-oriented state authorities up to grass root action networks. Analysis of the EUTD enables us to draw out specific insights and practical lessons for a broader audience. Before presenting our own empirical findings we first will sketch out the broader landscape of social science research and analysis of the EUTD. 2

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“…There are investigations on the subject in the literatüre (Gerard, Pickering, 2014;Gürkan, Coman, 2021;Harteveld et al, 2018;Niemann, Zaun, 2018;Storey, 2008;Thielemann, 2018;Zaun, 2018). These studies must also be evaluated with a critical eye.…”

Section: Research Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Most Important Changes in Eu Asylum and Refugee Policy After 2015

OLEKSIEWICZ,

ÖZ

2023

hss

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The current migration waves in the European Union, especially after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, are causing a lot of confusion. This has forced EU institutions and individual member states to rethink their policies towards refugees. Analysis of the migration phenomenon within the EU, due to its importance in both the European and international arenas, is crucial to achieving this goal. The research problem of this article is to discuss the impact of the migration and refugee crisis on EU refugee policy after 2015. The main hypothesis is that as a result of the “refugee crisis” in 2015, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic, a change occurred in the way EU security policy was conducted. An additional conditionality turned out to be the currently ongoing war in Ukraine, which caused a huge relocation of the population and, at the same time, revised the EU’s asylum legislation, showing its loopholes and inconsistencies. The research methodology includes a critical review of relevant literature, official documents, policy documents, primary and secondary legislation, statistical data, and content analysis.

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The EU–Turkey deal in the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’: when intergovernmentalism cast a shadow on the EU’s normative power

Cited by 17 publications

References 39 publications

Welfare Euroscepticism and socioeconomic status

Welfare Euroscepticism and socioeconomic status

Between Humanitarian Assistance and Externalizing of EU Borders: The EU-Turkey Deal and Refugee Related Organizations in Turkey

The Most Important Changes in Eu Asylum and Refugee Policy After 2015

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